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The First Century of Right to Arms
Litigation
By David B. Kopel 1
The Supreme Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence has paid careful
attention to the Second Amendment in the nineteenth century. District of
Columbia v. Heller cited with approval antebellum cases which struck down
handgun bans, or which upheld restrictions on concealed handgun carry, while
affirming the right of open carry. 2 Both Heller and McDonald v. Chicago looked
closely at the civil rights movement after the Civil War, when Congress
enacted legislation and the people ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, partly
for the purpose of making the Second Amendment enforceable against state
and local governments. 3 Heller also said that some “longstanding” gun controls
could be considered “presumptively lawful.” 4 So scholars have been mining
nineteenth-century statutes and cases to understand what types of gun laws
have nineteenth-century roots.
This Article examines state court cases involving the right to arms, during
the first century following ratification of the Amendment in 1791. This is not
the first article to survey some of those cases. 5 This Article includes additional
cases, and details the procedural postures and facts, not only the holdings.
With three important exceptions from Illinois in 1879, 6 none of the right to
Adjunct Professor of Advanced Constitutional Law, Denver University, Sturm College of
Law. Research Director, Independence Institute, Denver, Colorado. Associate Policy Analyst,
Cato Institute, Washington, D.C. Professor Kopel is the author of fifteen books and one
hundred scholarly journal articles, including the first law school textbook on the Second
Amendment: NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON, DAVID B. KOPEL, GEORGE A. MOCSARY & MICHAEL P.
O’SHEA, FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT: REGULATION, RIGHTS, AND POLICY
(2012). Kopel’s website is http://www.davekopel.org. Thanks to Caitlyn Foxhoven, Stephen P.
Halbrook, George A. Mocsary and Robert G. Natelson for helpful comments.
2 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 585, 611–14 (2008).
3 Heller at 614–19; McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 771–81 (2010); id. at 827–
50 (Thomas, J., concurring).
4 Heller at 626–27.
5 E.g., David B. Kopel & Clayton Cramer, State court standards of review for the right to
arms, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1113 (2010) (examining standards of review used by courts in
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries); David B. Kopel, What State Constitutions Teach
about the Second Amendment, 29 N. KY. L. REv. 845 (2002) (surveying constitutional texts and
judicial decisions to determine whether or not they protect an individual right); David B. Kopel,
The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1359 (lengthy survey of
nineteenth century treatises, political statements, leading cases, and other sources); see also
CLAYTON E. CRAMER, FOR THE DEFENSE OF THEMSELVES AND THE STATE: THE ORIGINAL INTENT
AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS (1994) (chronological
survey of cases); STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FIREARMS LAW DESKBOOK (2014-15 ed.). The first
scholarly article to survey state arms cases was Robert Dowlut & Janet A. Knoop, State
Constitutions and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 7 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 177 (1982).
6 Text at notes infra.
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arms cases appears to have arisen as a test case: they were ordinary criminal
or civil cases in which lawyers raised right to arms issues. The Article closely
examines how the Supreme Court integrated the nineteenth century arms
cases into Heller and McDonald to shape modern Second Amendment law.
Part I briefly explains two English cases which greatly influenced American
legal understandings. Semayne’s Case is the foundation of “castle doctrine”—
the right to home security which includes the right of armed self-defense in the
home. 7 Sir John Knight’s Case fortified the tradition of the right to bear arms,
providing that the person must bear arms in a non-terrifying manner. 8
Part II examines American antebellum cases; these are the cases to which
Heller looked for guidance on the meaning of the Second Amendment. Part III
looks at cases from Reconstruction and the early years of Jim Crow through
1891. As with the antebellum cases, the large majority of post-war cases are
from the Southeast, which during the nineteenth century was the region most
ardent for gun control. The heart of gun control country was Tennessee and
Arkansas; courts there resisted some infringements of the right to arms, but
eventually gave up. 9 Heller and McDonald did not look to the Jim Crow cases
as constructive precedents on the Second Amendment.
I.

The Colonial Heritage

Two English cases were particularly important in shaping the American
understanding of the right to keep and bear arms. Semayne’s Case (1604) was
about the home, stating that “every man’s home is his castle.” This became a
foundation of American self-defense law, the “Castle Doctrine.” The other case,
Sir John Knight (1685), affirmed that the peaceable public carrying of arms is
lawful, and that carrying with malicious intent to terrify people is not.

A. Semayne’s Case, the Castle Doctrine

When George Berisford died, he owed a debt to Peter Semayne. 10 Berisford
had lived in a house with Richard Gresham, as joint tenants. After Berisford
Text at notes infra.
Text at notes infra.
9 Text at notes infra.
10 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 5 Coke Rep. 91a (K.B. 1604). The case had previously been argued and
decided. According to the report of Semayne v. Gresham, 80 Eng. Rep. 21; Yelverton, 29 (1603),
the King’s Bench Justices agreed that Semayne would lose, but disagreed on the rationale.
One Justice, Fenner, argued that the sheriff had a right to try to break down the door, but “it
was the sheriff's fault that he did not break it.” Semayne could not sue Gresham just because
the sheriff did not succeed in breaking the door. Id. The decision in Semayne v. Gresham, is
described in second report, in addition to the report written by Justice Yelverton. The final
sentence of the other report seems to indicate that when Justice David Williams joined the
court (Feb. 4, 1604), the decision was made to issue a new opinion, with the same result.
Semayne v. Gresham, 72 Eng. Rep. 828; Moo. K. B. 668 (no. 917) (1604) (“Mes fuit adjudge
quant Williams vient al bench sur l’argument des Judges overtsmt, que l'accõn no gist, et quod
querens nihil capiat per breve.”). The final part of the sentence means “that the action did not
7
8
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died, the house passed fully to Gresham, by survivorship. Berisford had owned
various goods and papers which he had kept at home; Gresham retained
them. 11
Semayne secured a writ for the Sheriff of London to seize Berisford’s goods
to satisfy the debt. But when the Sheriff came to Gresham’s home, Gresham
shut the door, and would not let him in. Semayne sued Gresham for frustrating
the execution of the writ. 12
The King’s Bench ruled against him: Gresham had a right to keep his doors
locked, and to exclude anyone who did not knock, announce, and demonstrate
lawful authority to enter. 13
The court explained “[t]hat the house of every one is his castle and fortress,
and if thieves come to man’s house to rob or murder, and the owner or his
servants kill any of the thieves in defence of himself and his house, it is not
felony, and he shall lose nothing.” 14
Semayne’s Case was consistent with a 1499 precedent that had used similar
language to hold that a person can gather “his friends and neighbors to help
him” defend his home; but a person may not go to markets with an assembly
of bodyguards. 15
lie, and that the plaintiff should take nothing by his brief.” For Justice Williams’ tenure, see
JOHN SAINTY, THE JUDGES OF ENGLAND 1272 -1990: A LIST OF JUDGES OF THE SUPERIOR COURTS
31 (1993). The final opinion, Semayne’s Case, was unanimous, and carefully supported by cited
authority.
Most English case reports in the seventeenth century, and all English reports in the
fourteenth through sixteenth centuries, were originally written in a specialized language
called “Law French.” English translations were published much later. In the quote above,
“overtsmt” should have a tilde above the “m.” (Or in Law French, a “tittle”). Unfortunately,
modern font sets are not designed with Law French even a little in mind. In Law French, a
tittle indicates the omission of some preceding and/or succeeding letters. J.H. BAKER, MANUAL
OF LAW FRENCH 18 (2d ed. 1990).
11 Id., 77 Eng. Rep. at 194–95.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 199.
14 Id., 77 Eng. Rep. at 194.
15 Y.B. Trin. 14 Hen. 7 (1499), reported in Y.B. 21 Henry 7, fol. 39, Mich., pl. 50 (1506)
(“Anonymous.” No case name):
If one is in his house, and hears that such a one will come to his house to beat
him, he may assemble folk of his friends and neighbors to help him, and aid in
the safeguard of his person; but if one were threatened that if he should come
to such a market, or into such a place, he should there be beaten, in that case
he could not assemble persons to help him go there in personal safety, for he
need not go there, and he may have a remedy by surety of the peace. But a
man’s house is his castle and defense, and where he has a peculiar right to
stay.
“Surety of the peace” was a procedure by which a threatening person could be required to post
bond for good behavior (or to have other persons post a bond on his behalf). Surety of the peace,
BLACK’S LAW DICT. 1671 (Byron Garner ed.) (10th ed. 2014).The procedure was used in the
United States for persons who carried arms while threatening a particular individual. See note
__ infra.
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Most of Semayne’s Case detailed the conditions about when and how
sheriffs could enter homes. The foundational rule was: “In all cases when the
King is party, the sheriff may break the house, either to arrest or to do other
execution upon the King’s process, if otherwise he cannot enter. But he ought
first to signify the cause of is coming, and to make request to open doors.” 16
Semayne’s maxim that “a man’s house is his castle’’ is in twenty-first
century America probably the best-known language from any English case. In
the U.S. Bill of Rights, the Second, Third, and Fourth Amendments are a
cluster which protects pre-eminently (but not exclusively) the sanctity of the
home. 17 So Castle Doctrine is a foundation of the Fourth Amendment. In 1761,
Great Britain’s Parliament authorized “writs of assistance,” which allowed the
British army to conduct warrantless searches in order to crack down on the
widespread import/export smuggling (for tax avoidance) that was taking place
in New England. James Otis was the Advocate-General (like an Attorney
General) of Massachusetts. Rather than defend the legality of the writs of
assistance, he resigned. He then became the attorney for plaintiffs challenging
the writs.
His oral argument against the writs, which quoted Castle Doctrine, was
widely reprinted, and became the most famous legal speech in colonial
America. 18 The speech’s principles were enshrined in the Fourth
Amendment. 19 Much later, the great progressive and future Supreme Court
Justice Louis Brandeis would rely on Castle Doctrine in his seminal article
arguing for judicial recognition of the right of privacy. 20

77 Eng. Rep. at 194.
Cf. David I. Caplan, The Right to Have Arms and Use Deadly Force Under the Second
and Third Amendments, 2 J. FIREARMS & PUB. POL’Y 165 (1989).
18 James Otis, Against Writs of Assistance (Feb. 24, 1761, argument before Superior Court
of Massachusetts), in CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 524 (1856) (John
Adams’s
notes
recording
Otis’s
speech),
available
at
http://constitution.org/bor/otis_against_writs.htm:
16
17

Now, one of the most essential branches of English liberty is the freedom
of one's house. A man’s house is his castle; and whilst he is quiet, he is as well
guarded as a prince in his castle. This writ, if it should be declared legal, would
totally annihilate this privilege. Custom-house officers may enter our houses
when they please; we are commanded to permit their entry. Their menial
servants may enter, may break locks, bars, and everything in their way; and
whether they break through malice or revenge, no man, no court can inquire.
Bare suspicion without oath is sufficient.
See William Cuddihy & B. Carmon Hardy, A Man’s House Was Not His Castle: Origins
of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 37 WM. & MARY Q. 3d 371 (1980).
20 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
220 (1890) (‘‘The common law has always recognized a man’s house as his castle, impregnable.
. . .’’).
19
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Semayne’s Case provided the standard American rule for the right to use
deadly force against home invaders. 21 The Supreme Court has studied
Semayne’s Case repeatedly, recognizing its principle about repelling violent
intruders, and examining the opinion closely to discern the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. 22 Today, many states have passed laws to affirm the
common law doctrine that a person who is violently attacked by a home invader
has no duty to retreat before using deadly force. These laws are often called
“Castle Doctrine.”
During the first century of the American Bill of Rights, nearly all of the
cases that involved Castle Doctrine related to when and how sheriffs or other
government officers could enter homes. 23 The right of armed home defense was
uncontested in this period (except for slaves and for free people of color in some
slave states); 24 the few cases exploring the self-defense contours of Castle

E.g., 1 WHARTON ON CRIMINAL LAW § 633 (11th ed. 1912) (“Where one is assaulted in his
home, or the home itself is attacked, he may use such means as are necessary to repel the
assailant from the house, or to prevent his forcible entry, or material injury to his home, even
to the taking of life. In this sense, and in this sense alone, are we to understand that maxim
that, ‘Every man’s house is his castle.’”) (some internal quotation marks omitted).
22
There are thirteen citations since the Warren Court, including three in the twentyfirst century. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006) (“an unannounced entry may
provoke violence in supposed self-defense by the surprised resident”); Georgia v. Randolph,
547 U.S. 103, 123 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring); United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 41
(2003); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609–10 (1999); id. at 622 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 95 (1998); id. at 99–100 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The
axiom that a man’s home is his castle…has acquired over time a power and an independent
significance justifying a more general assurance of personal security in one’s home, an
assurance which has become part of our constitutional tradition.); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514
U.S. 927, 931, 932 n.2, 935–36 (1995) (“knock and announce” is a factor in determining Fourth
Amendment reasonableness of a search; Semayne reaffirmed an ancient common law rule);
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 488 n.3 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 217–19 (1981); id.
at 228–30 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 592–93, 596–97, 615
n.11 (1980) (“The zealous and frequent repetition of the adage that a ‘man’s house is his castle,’
made it abundantly clear that both in England and in the Colonies ‘the freedom of one’s house’
was one of the most vital elements of English liberty.”); id. at 604–05 (White, J., dissenting);
Ker v. State of Calif., 374 U.S. 23, 47, 54 n.8, 57 n.11 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring in part);
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 308 (1958).
For analysis of Semayne’s Case as it relates to modern self-defense rights, see David I.
Caplan & Sue Wimmershoff-Caplan, Postmodernism and the Model Penal Code v. The Fourth,
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments—and the Castle Privacy Doctrine in the Twenty-First
Century, 73 UMKC L. REV. 1073 (2005).
23 For a summary of American doctrine on this, see When a House is not a Castle, 6 ALBANY
L.J. 379 (1872–73).
24 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 844–50 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (collecting statutes and cases); David B. Kopel, Background Checks for Firearms
Sales and Loans: Law, History, and Policy, 53 HARV. J. LEGISL. (2015, forthcoming)
(additional statutes and cases), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2665432
21
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Doctrine held that it applied to felons invading the home, and not to other
situations, such as civil trespassers on land. 25

B. Sir John Knight’s Case, lawful peaceable carry.

England’s 1328 Statute of Northampton statute had provided:
Item, it is enacted, that no man great nor small, of what condition
soever he be, except the king’s servants in his presence, and his
ministers in executing of the king’s precepts, or of their office, and
such as be in their company assisting them, and also [upon a cry
made for arms to keep the peace, and the same in such places
where such acts happen,] be so hardy to come before the King’s
justices, or other of the King’s ministers doing their office, with
force and arms, nor bring no force in affray of the peace, nor to go
nor ride armed by night or by day, in fairs, markets, nor in the
presence of the justices or other ministers, nor in no part
elsewhere, upon pain to forfeit their armour to the King, and their
bodies to prison at the King’s pleasure. 26

As of 1328, the government in England was near collapse. The previous
year, King Edward II was had been deposed by an invasion led by his wife,
Queen Isabella (a French Princess). Isabella and her ally Roger Mortimer took
over the government, which was nominally led by Edward III, the son of
Edward II and Isabella. The monarchy’s ability to enforce the law was close to
non-existent. 27
As indicated by the statutory language, the primary concern was “the
gentry…using armed force to defeat the course of justice.” 28 For decades there
had been a problem of “magnates maintaining criminals.” 29

See, e.g., Lee v. State, 92 Ala. 15 (1891) (no-retreat rule applies in the home and
curtilage); Watkins v. States, 89 Ala. 82 (1890); Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 10 Ky. L. Rptr.
910 (1889) (applies to cellar); Wright v. Commonwealth, 85 Ky. 123, 2 S.W. 904, 908 (1887)
(“He was not required to flee from his dwelling, but had the right to stand his ground, and use
all the force necessary…”); State v. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308 (1873); Pierce v. Hicks, 34 Ga. 259
(1866) (applies to a licensed tippling house, which was also part of defendant’s home); Curtis
v. Hubbard, 4 Hill 437, 439 (N.Y. 1824) (“For a man's house is his castle, not for his own
personal protection merely, but also for the protection of his family and his property therein,
while it is occupied as his residence.”);
26 I THE STATUTES: REVISED EDITION, HENRY III TO JAMES II, A.D. 1235-6—1685 at 258
(1870); 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328).
27 Anthony Verduyn, The Politics of Law and Order during the Early Years of Edward III,
108 ENG. HIST. REV. 842 (1993).
28 W. R. Jones, Rex et ministri: English Local Government and the Crisis of 1341, 13 J.
BRIT. STUDS. 1, 19 (1973).
29 Verduyn at 849.
25
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The House of “Commons’ complaints about armed noblemen” were
congenial to Queen Isabella and her consort Roger Mortimer. Fearful of being
overthrown, the Queen did not want armed men coming to Parliament, or
traveling armed to meet the Queen. 30 They favored a measure to render it
“politically necessary to check dissent against the increasingly unpopular
regime.” 31
In 1330, Edward III seized power from his mother, and faced many of the
same problems: “one of the most profound causes of disorder was the continued
bond of many noblemen with malefactors. 32 As the young king understood,
“many offenders were stronger than royal officials, not only because they had
the support of the nobility, but also because they were members of the gentry
or could draw upon the local criminal fraternity.” 33
Edward III undertook to “reinforce his officials with men-at-arms and to
ride with them if necessary.” 34 By 1332, there was sufficient feeling “that
disorder had abated” so that Edward III could launch a war against Scotland,
without feeling any political need to provide for keeping the peace during his
absence. 35
While the Statute of Northampton was primarily concerned with armed
nobles frustrating judicial process, the statutory language was not solely about
nobles or courts. The “no part elsewhere” language could be read as general
carry prohibition; yet that reading would render the preceding details (about
particular places and officials) surplusage. Moreover, we know that the most
common arm, a knife, was routinely carried, as a necessary tool for everyday
activities such as cutting food, and necessarily available for self-defense in an
emergency. English law required villages to provide target practice areas, and
required families to teach their sons archery; later, the archery mandate was
replaced with a musket mandate 36 That in itself would necessarily make it
common for people to walk around carrying arms. The 1328 statute seems
primarily aimed at noblemen who appeared before the king or his ministers
wearing armor; that may be why the first penalty for violators was “to forfeit
their armour.” 37
Verduyn at 849.
Verduyn at 856.
32 Verduyn at 860.
33 Verduyn at 860–61.
34 Verduyn at 860.
35 Verduyn at 864.
36 33 Henry VIII, c. 3 (1541); 33 Henry VIII, c. 9 (1541); JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND
BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT 6 (1994) (mandatory longbow practice
was later replaced by mandatory musket practice).
37 Cf. CALENDAR OF THE CLOSE ROLLS, EDWARD III, 1337-1339 104–05 (Feb. 20, 1337,
Hatfield) (H.C. Maxwell-Lyte ed., 1900) (order to the Sheriff of Berks explaining that men had
been plotting “to beat, wound and ill-treat jurors” and that the Sheriff should enforce the law
that “no one, except the king’s serjeants and ministers, shall go armed or ride with armed
power before the justices at the said day and places, nor do anything against the peace.”).
30
31
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Any doubts of the meaning were resolved shortly before the Glorious
Revolution of 1688. Tensions had been rising because King James II was trying
to disarm the entire English population, except for his political supporters. Sir
John Knight was an Anglican and a fierce opponent of the Catholic King. Along
with three friends, he allegedly “did walk about the streets armed with guns,
and that he went into church of St. Michael, in Bristol, in the time of divine
service, with a gun, to terrify the King’s subjects.” 38 This resulted in arrest,
prosecution, and then acquittal by a jury. Two different reporters wrote about
the case. 39 According to the first reporter, the Chief Justice stated that the
statute “was to punish people who go armed to terrify the King’s subjects.” 40
The latter reporter elaborated that the Chief Justice of the King’s Bench said
“this statute be almost gone in desuetudinem” 41 for “now there be a general
connivance to gentlemen to ride armed for their security.” 42 However, “where
the crime shall appear to be malo animo 43 it will come within the act.” 44 Under
both reports, only malicious, terrifying carry was illegal. As quoted by the
court, the Statute of Northampton applied to arms-carrying before judges and
other government officials (“coming with force and arms before the King’s
Justices, &c.”) or to “going or riding armed in affray of the peace.” 45 The
prosecution had a similar, narrow view of the Statute. The criminal
Information stated that the Statute was about persons whose particular
manner was “to terrify the King’s subjects.” 46 Although the prosecutor thought
that Knight had been carrying in terrifying manner, the jury disagreed. 47
Sir John Knight’s Case, 87 Eng. Rep. 75, 76, 3 Mod. 117 (K.B. 1685).
The latter reporter divided the case into two parts. The first part, dealing with the
meaning of the Statute of Northampton, is Rex v. Sir John Knight, 90 Eng. Rep. 330;
Comberbach, 38 (1686).
40 87 Eng. Rep. at 76. The case is also called Rex v. Knight.
41 A term for a statute that has become obsolete from disuse. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 404
(5th ed. 1979).
42 90 Eng. Rep. at 330.
43 “With an evil mind; with a bad purpose or wrongful intention, with malice.” BLACK’S
DICT. at 864.
44 90 Eng. Rep. at 330.
45 87 Eng. Rep. at 75–76.
46 87 Eng. Rep. at 76.
47 One scholar argues that Sir John Knight was within the statute’s exemption of the
“king’s ministers.” Patrick J. Charles, The Faces of the Second Amendment Outside The Home:
History versus Ahistorical Standards of Review, 60 CLEVELAND ST. L. REV. 1, 28, 30 (2012).
One indication that Knight was not engaged in law enforcement activity on behalf of the King
was that Knight was personally prosecuted by the Attorney General. 90 Eng. Rep. at 331. This
is not exactly a sign of that King James II approved of what Knight was doing.
Second, Charles has overlooked the second half of one of the case reports. The second part
of the report is Rex v. Sir John Knight, 90 Eng. Rep. 331, Comberbach, 41 (1686). As the second
part explains, after Knight was acquitted, the Attorney General nevertheless moved that
Knight be required to post a bond for good behavior. The King’s Bench upheld the bond. Id. As
discussed below, American courts also required bonds for persons whose arms-carrying
behavior, even if not criminal, was threatening in manner. See text at notes –. The decision of
38
39
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the King’s Bench, that John Knight should be required to post bond for good behavior, strongly
indicates that Knight was not engaged in law enforcement.
Going beyond the case reports, Charles cites a diary that was written in a secret code, and
finally decoded and published in the twenty-first century. The ENTRING BOOK OF ROGER
MORRICE (Mark Goldie ed., 2009), cited in Charles at 28–30 (12 footnotes). The diary says that
at trial, Knight had pointed out some recent threats against him, from Irish Catholics.
However, the Statute of Northampton had no exemption for persons subject to identifiable
threats. The existence of a particular threat was relevant because the statute applied solely
to persons who carried with malignant intent.
Charles’ assertion that Knight was acquitted “because he was a government official who
was well-affected to the crown.” is not supported by cited source, a diary published in 1857. Id.
at 30. The diary tells that on June 12, 1686, Knight “pleaded not guilty to an information
exhibited against him for goeing with a blunderbuss in the streets, to the terrifyeing [of] his
majesties subjects.” 1 NARCISSUS LUTTRELL, A BRIEF HISTORICAL RELATION OF STATE AFFAIRS
FROM SEPTEMBER 1678 TO APRIL 1714, at 380 (1857). On December 23 of that year,
sir John Knight, the loyall, was tried at the court of kings bench for a high
misdemeanor, in goeing armed up and down with a gun at Bristoll; who being
tried by a jury of his own city, that knew him well, he was acquitted, not
thinking he did it with any ill design, to the great disappointment of some
persons who appeared very fierce against him: ‘tis thought his being concerned
in taking up a popish priest at Bristoll occasioned this prosecution.
Id. at 389. So Knight was acquitted because he had no “ill design”—exactly the principle which
the Chief Justice affirmed in describing the Statute of Northampton as applying only to carry
malo animo.
Charles also contends that Knight himself “even cited Richard II's statute exempting
governmental officials from punishment.” Charles at 30 (citing without elaboration “90 Eng.
Rep. 330). Knight’s attorney made no such argument. According to the report of the case,
“Winnington, pro defendente. This statute was made to prevent the people’s being oppressed
by great men; but this is a private matter, and not within the statute. Vide stat. 20 R. 2.” 90
Eng. Rep. at 330. Rather than claiming to have been carrying arms to serve the king, Knight
had claimed that his arms carrying was “a private matter.” He argued that the Statute of
Northampton was only intended to cover heavily armed nobles who oppressed the public.
Charles believes that the citation to a statute from King Richard II meant that Knight
was invoking a law enforcement exemption. The statute cited by Knight’s lawyer was 20
Richard II ch. 1 (1396–97); 2 STATUTES OF THE REALM 93 (1816). Contrary to Charles, King
Richard’s statute did not create an exemption for people in government service. That
exemption already existed in the Statute of Northampton (“the king’s servants in his presence,
and his ministers in executing of the king’s precepts, or of their office”). Richard II stated the
rule more succinctly (“save and except the King’s Officers and Ministers in doing their Office.”).
The only novel feature of Richard II’s order was that it specifically and completely prohibited
“launcegays”—a type of spear that was an “offensive weapon.” Id.; 2 THOMAS EDLYNE TOMLIN,
THE LAW-DICTIONARY: EXPLAINING THE RISE, PROGRESS AND PRESENT STATE OF THE BRITISH
LAW (London 1820) (unpageinated); GEORGE CAMERON STONE, A GLOSSARY OF THE
CONSTRUCTION, DECORATION AND USE OF ARMS AND ARMOR IN ALL COUNTRIES AND IN ALL
TIMES 410 (1999) (“”Lance-ague, lancegaye. A light lance, occasionally used as a dart. It was
carried in place of the war lance in the 14th century; the latter at the time was about fourteen
feet long and very heavy.”). An offensive weapon used exclusively by mounted nobles was very
different from the common blunderbuss (a primitive firearm) carried by Knight.
In sum, there is no basis in the case reports, or in Luttrell’s diary, for Charles’s assertion
that Knight was acquitted because he was a government agent.
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Everyone in the case agreed that the Statute of Northampton outlawed only
carrying in a terrifying manner. 48 This was in accordance with longestablished construction, as expressed, for example in Michael Dalton’s widelyread 1622 manual of Justice of the Peace, The Country Justice, 49 and likewise
Of course information in personal diaries had no effect on the development of legal doctrine
in America in the decades and centuries following Sir John Knight’s Case. The legal sources
available to American judges and commentators were the case reports themselves, or treatises,
such as Hawkins.
48 Two weeks after Knight’s acquittal, King James II, ordered full enforcement of the Game
Act of 1671; that act, ostensibly enacted to protect commoners from hunting on aristocrats’
lands, set high property qualifications for gun ownership. The King’s repression intensified
the political crisis which led to his being overthrown in 1688, and to Parliament in 1689
enacting a Bill of Rights, which protected the right to arms. MALCOLM. In England, a statute
allowed a Catholic to keep firearms with permission from a local justice of the peace ‘‘for the
defence of his House or person.’’ 1 Wm. & Mary, ch. 15 (1689). According to James Madison’s
notes for his speech introducing the proposed U.S. Bill of Rights in Congress, among the defects
of the English Bill of Rights was that it was a “mere act of parlt.” (and thus could be constricted
by a future Parliament), and that is protected only protected only ‘‘arms to Protestts.’’ James
Madison, Notes for Speech in Congress Supporting Amendments, June 8, 1789, in THE ORIGIN
OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 645 (David E. Young ed., 1991).
49 MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTREY JUSTICE (London, William Rollins & Samuel Roycroft
1622). Citing the Statute of Northampton, Dalton explained that the question was one of
intent:
And therefore if divers in one companie, going to the Church, Faire, or
Market, shall goe armed, or one going to the Session, or other like assembly,
shall go with his servants in Harnesse (to the terror of the people) though hee,
or they, have no intent to fight, or to commit any Ryot, het this is a Rout by the
manner of his or their going, being needlesse, disorder, and against the law.
See the statute 2 Ed. 3. Ca. 3.
But in the former cases, if they had gone in privie coats of Plate, shirts or
Maile, or the like, to the intent to defend themselves some adversarie, this
seemeth not punishable with these statutes, for that there is nothing openly
done, in terrorum populi.
Id. at 205 (chapter on Riots); see also id. at 31 (chapter on Armour) (citing Statute of
Northampton, and its restatement for Richard II, for rule that Justice of the Peace should
arrest “If any person shall ride, or go Armed offensively….”); MICHAEL DALTON, OFFICIUM
VICECOMITUM: THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITIE OF SHERIFS 14 (The Lawbook Exchange 2009)
(1623) (Sheriffs “mae and ought to arrest all such persons as goe or ride armed offensively”).
Dalton’s treatise was very influential in England, and was also used in America. THOMAS
GARDEN BARNES, SHAPING THE COMMON LAW 136–51 (Allen D. Boyer ed., 2008). It was “The
most popular and authoritative justice manual during the early period” of American history.
John A. Conley, Doing it by the Book: Justice of the Peace Manuals and English Law in
Eighteenth Century America, 6 J. LEGAL HIST. 257, 261 (1985).
Surprisingly, Charles does not cite Dalton. Instead, he cites some later, lesser manuals.
Charles at 23–26. There is no evidence cited that any of these manuals ever crossed the
Atlantic. One of these manuals explains that constables were required to organize men to keep
“Watch” of towns from sunrise to sunset; the Watchmen were required to detain suspicious
persons. The Watchmen had to be “sufficiently Armed.” P.B., A. HELP TO MAGISTRATES, AND
MINISTERS OF JUSTICE 107 (2d ed., London 1700) (ch. 53). The watchmen’s duties included that
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in a 1584 treatise explaining that concealed carry was lawful, since its manner
could not terrify anyone. 50
When Parliament wanted to ban carrying in general, it knew how to do so,
as in a 1695 statute against arms carrying (and possession) by Catholics in

“The Watch in this Case are to Apprehend such as ride, or go Armed, Scouts, Evesdropers,
Noctivagrants, Night-walker, and all sorts of Rogues and Vagabonds, &c. 1 Dalton Chap. 60.
Folio 140. 5 Hen. 7. 5. 5 Edw. 3. 14.” Id.. This indicates that armed watchmen were, during the
night, expected to detain suspicious characters; it does not support Charles’ assertion that
arms-carrying was forbidden, day or night. More fundamentally, practical manuals written for
law enforcement officers, and based on ancient statutes, are not controlling law, whereas the
authoritative decisions of the King’s Bench Justices are.
50

Thomas figet chivaler ale armed south se drapes al Westminster, sur que
suit attache, & il dit que bn Sir John Trevert luy manace, a pur sa vie saver il
eítroit arme, & non obítant ses fuet soqs. Per agarv, & fuit prise, & il fuit
comanuv sur quant que it poit fors. Q il ne ferra male as dit Sir Thomas.
23.C.3.33 per hoc appiert, que home ne alera armed overtment, coment que
soyt pur son defence, me semble que home poit aler armed ouu privie coate de
plate south son coate, ou &c. car ceo ne poit encuter alcun feare al people,
Quare tamen.
RICHARD CROMPTON, L’OFFICE ET AUCTHORITIE DE IUSTICES DE PEACE 58 (2014) (London 1584)
(numerous diacriticals omitted, as they are not in modern font sets). The gist of analysis is
that “a man will not go armed overtly, event though it be for his defense, but it seems that a
man can go armed under his private coat of plate, underneath his coat etc., because this cannot
cause any fear among people.” Judge Posner made a similar point. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d
933, 936–37 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Some weapons do not terrify the public (such as well-concealed
weapons)”).
Crompton’s treatise may reflect a sensibility of the late sixteenth century, in favor of
concealed carry. This is congruent with twenty-first century American sensibilities, and just
the opposite of nineteenth century American sensibilities. See text at notes ------.
Four decades after Crompton’s treatise was published, King James I, in the first year of
his reign, proclaimed that “the bearing of Weapons covertly, and specially of short Dagges
[daggers], and Pistol…had ever beene…straitly forbidden,” the practice had “is suddenly
growen very common.” Accordingly, the carrying or import of daggers or guns shorter than
twelve inches was forbidden. 1 ROYAL PROCLAMATION OF KING JAMES I, 1603–1625, at 285 §
126 (1973) (proclamation Jan. 16, 1613). The proclamation may have been motivated by
reports of Spain (England’s mortal enemy) smuggling pocket pistols into England. Id. at 284
n.1. The same month, the King ordered the disarmament of all Catholics. Id.
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Ireland. 51 This was compliant with Bill of Rights, which had recognized an
arms right only for “protestants.” 52
A treatise published in 1694, less than a decade after Sir John Knight’s
Case was decided, said that the Statute of Northampton allows persons to carry
arms “in their own defence against Illegal Violence.” 53
A leading treatise on criminal law was by William Hawkins, published in
1716. 54 It confirmed that the Statute of Northampton was for “dangerous and
unusual” arms, not common ones: “That in some Cases there may be an Affray
where there is no actual Violence; as where a Man arms himself with
dangerous and unusual Weapons, in such a Manner as will naturally cause a
Terror to the People, which is said to have been always an Offence at the
Common Law, and is strictly prohibited by many Statutes.” 55
A half-century later, Blackstone explained the Statute:
The offense of riding or going armed with dangerous or unusual
weapons, is a crime against the public peace, by terrifying the
good people of the land; and is particularly prohibited by the
Statute of Northampton, upon pain of forfeiture of the arms, and
imprisonment during the king’s pleasure: in like manner as, by

An Act for the better securing the government, by disarming papists (1695) (forbidding
arms and ammunition possession by Irish Catholics); cf. DALTON at 94 (arms of convicted
“popish Recusants” may be seized).
Charles cites two articles from The Post Boy, a newspaper in Dublin, Ireland, regarding
arms licenses, and argues that they show that a stringent system of gun licensing persisted
even after the enactment of the English Bill of Rights in 1689. Charles at 27–28. He overlooks
the fact that The Post Boy was reporting on events in Ireland, where the Catholic population,
as expressly stated in the English Bill of Rights, had no right to arms. Notably, his quotation
from The Post Boy about the recall of carry licenses (many of which had been obtained
fraudulently) applied to “all Licenses whatsoever to bear Arms, formerly Granted to any Papist
in this Kingdom.” THE POST BOY, Dec. 19–21, 1699 at 1, col. 1.
52 “The subjects which are protestants may have arms for their defence suitable to their
conditions as and allowed by law.” James Madison, of course, expressly intended that the
Second Amendment would abolish the arms restrictions on religious minorities. See note
supra.
53 JAMES TYRRELL, BIBLIOTHECA POLITICA 639 (London, W. Rawlins, S. Roycroft & H.
Sawbridge 1694). The language quoted above was in the context of Tyrell’s argument that if
the king acted contrary to the law, such as by murdering or robbing his subjects, the subjects
had a right of armed resistance. Id. at 459–65. One reason was that “Prior to all Civil Law” is
“the Right of Self-Defence or Preservation.” Id. at 464.
54 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1716). Charles cites an
English constable’s manual from 1692, and two manuals from earlier in that century, for the
proposition that constables should arrest anyone who does armed. Charles at 23–24. Yet the
1708 third edition of the manual contains no such instruction. It simply says that constables
should search for arms possessed by persons who are “dangerous” or “papists.” ROBERT
GARDINER, THE COMPLEAT CONSTABLE 18 (3d ed. 1708).
55 Id. at 110.
51
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the laws of Solon, every Athenian was finable who walked about
the city in armour. 56
Subsequent case law confirmed that peaceable carry was lawful. 57 American
state statutes likewise respected peaceable carry; for example, Massachusetts
and Virginia adopted their own versions of the principle embodied in the
Statute of Northampton, and they expressly limited it to carrying which was
“offensive” or meant to cause “terror.” 58 This did not foreclose some regulation
of the manner of carry. New Jersey was the first to ban concealed carry, in
1686. 59 Not until 1966 did New Jersey limit open carry.
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *148–49 (1st ed.
1769).
57 See Rex v. Dewhurst, 1 State Trials, N.S. 529, 601-02 (1820) (“But are arms suitable to
the condition of people in the ordinary class of life, and are they allowed by law? A man has a
clear right to protect himself when he is going singly or in a small party upon the road where
he is travelling or going for the ordinary purposes of business.”); see also Rex v. Smith, 2 Ir.
Rep. 190, 204 (K.B. 1914) (law allows peaceably walking down the road with a revolver); Rex
v. Meade, 19 L. Times Rep. 540, 541 (1903) (right to peaceable carry does not apply to “firing
a revolver in a public place, with the result that the public were frightened or terrorized.”).
58 See, e.g., 2 Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, from November 28, 1780 to
February 28, 1807 652, 653 (enacted Jan. 27, 1795) (Boston: 1807) (Justices of the Peace should
arrest “all affrayers, rioters, disturbers, or breakers of the peace, and such as shall ride or go
armed offensive, to the fear or terrour of the good citizens of this Commonwealth, or such
others may utter any menaces or threatening speeches”; upon conviction, such a person shall
be required “to find sureties for his keeping the peace”).
North Carolina’s only statutory restriction on persons going “armed” was for slaves.
COMPLETE REVISAL OF ALL THE ACTS OF ASSEMBLY, OF THE PROVINCE OF NORTH-CAROLINA,
NOW IN FORCE AND USE 152–53 (enacted 1753) (1773). A 1792 treatise quoted the Statute of
Northampton as among the English statutes in effect in North Carolina. FRANCOIS-XAVIER
MARTIN, A COLLECTION OF STATUTES OF THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND IN FORCE IN THE STATE
OF NORTH-CAROLINA 60–61 (Newbern 1792). An 1838 North Carolina statute abrogated the
effect of all English statutes in North Carolina. Even so, the North Carolina Supreme Court
said that the statute had merely reflected a common law principle. The common law did not
forbid peaceable carry. State v. Huntly, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 418, 422–23 (1843) (“the carrying of
a gun per se constitutes no offence…. He shall not carry about this or any other weapon of
death to terrify and alarm, and in such manner as naturally will terrify and alarm, a peaceful
people.”). See also text at notes infra.
Likewise, Virginia’s 1786 analogue to the Statute of Northampton said that persons must
not “go nor ride armed by night or by day, in fairs or markets, or in other places, in terror of
the Country.” A COLLECTION OF ALL SUCH ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, OF A
PUBLIC AND PERMANENT NATURE, AS ARE NOW IN FORCE 30 (enacted Nov. 27, 1786) (Richmond
1803); cf. see also GEORGE WEBB, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF PEACE 92
(Williamsburg 1736) (A constable “may take away Arms from such who ride, or go, offensively
armed, in Terror of the People” and may bring the person and the arms before a Justice of the
Peace). Webb’s treatise was endorsed by Virginia Attorney General John Clayton. Id. at ii. It
was the first Justice of Peace manual to integrate American and English law. Conley at 273–
75.
59 See THE GRANTS, CONCESSIONS, AND ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONS OF THE PROVINCE OF NEWJERSEY 289–90 (enacted 1686) (1758) (“no Person or Persons after Publication hereof shall
presume privately to wear any Pocket Pistol, Skeines, Stilladoes [stilettos], Daggers or Dirks,
56
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American courts have cited the Statute of Northampton, sometimes with
consideration of how it was construed by Sir John Knight’s Case and
Blackstone, and occasionally not. 60 The earliest American decision was the
Tennessee Supreme Court’s Simpson v. State (1833), affirming that carrying
arms in public is lawful. That case is discussed infra. 61 The Supreme Court in
Heller echoed the spirit (although not the exact doctrine) of Hawkins’s and
Blackstone’s explication of Sir John Knight’s Case: “dangerous and unusual”
weapons, such as machine guns or sawed-off shotguns, may be prohibited. The
American cases on which Heller drew will be discussed below.

II.

Antebellum Cases

From the Early Republic through the Jacksonian Era and then up to the
Civil War, almost every right to arms case came from the South. 62 This was
probably because the South at the time was far more ardent about arms control
than was the rest of the nation. This would become all the more true in the
decades following the Civil War. The main line of the antebellum Southern
cases, many of which are cited with approval in District of Columbia v. Heller,
is that bans on concealed carry are constitutional as long as people can carry
openly; in contrast, banning all or most handguns is unconstitutional. Based
on Heller, most of the antebellum cases are examples of correct interpretation
of the right to arms.
The main line of these cases establish the following rules:
•
•

The right to arms belongs to everyone, not just the militia.
A law which bans all or most handguns violates the right.

or other unusual or unlawful Weapons…”). A skein (or skain, skeyn, scjan, skean) was a
double-edged dagger, associated with Ireland and Scotland. LOGAN THOMPSON, DAGGERS AND
BAYONETS (1999); STONE at 566–67. Charles misreads the statute; he quotes from the
preamble, which is a broad complaint about challenges for duels. Charles at 32. He neglects
the operative language of the statute, which applied to the “Pocket Pistol” but not to larger
handguns, and which only prohibited wearing the listed weapons “privately.”
60 See, e.g., Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936–37 (7th Cir. 2012) (examining Sir John
Knight’s Case, Blackstone, and Edward Coke to conclude that the statute only banned armscarrying in certain places, or by large assemblies. “Some weapons do not terrify the public
(such as well-concealed weapons)…”) (parenthetical in original); State v. Huntly, 25 N.C. (3
Ired.) 418, 421 (1843) (declaring the Statute to be part of the common law, and applying the
limitation expressed in Sir John Knight’s Case); United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266 (3d
Cir. 1942), rev’d on other grounds 319 U.S. 463 (1943) (Not addressing commentary, citing
Statute for the point that “Weapon bearing was never treated as anything like an absolute
right by the common law.”). At Tot’s level of generality, the statement is consistent with Sir
John Knight’s Case; the right is not “absolute” since a person may not exercise the right in a
manner calculated to terrify the public.
61 Text at notes infra.
62 One exception is an 1829 case upholding Indiana’s ban on concealed carry. The very
short opinion provides no information and no reasoning. It simply announces the result in a
single paragraph. State v. Mitchel, 3 Blackf. 229 (Ind. 1833).
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•
•
•

Concealed carry may be prohibited as long as open carry is lawful.
Enhanced punishment for using especially dangerous arms in a
violent crime does not violate the right to arms.
The right to keep and bear arms may not destroyed under the guise
of regulation.

We also see, in Tennessee after 1837, the deleterious effects of prohibiting
popular arms which people are determined to own: courts must invent fanciful
interpretations in order to uphold the bans; laws criminalizing otherwise lawabiding citizens for carrying common arms may be enforced with harsh
mandatory sentence, which ensnare persons who lawfully defend themselves.
Although Tennessee’s bad example had little influence before the Civil War,
after the War Tennessee grew worse, and its influence did spread, as we shall
see in Part III.

A. Kentucky

Bliss v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1822). 63 Bliss carried a sword-cane—that is, a
short sword concealed inside a walking stick. 64 This violated a state statute.
Although the case report does not provide information about how Bliss came
to the attention of the prosecutor, the statute provided that “the informer”
would receive half of the fine. 65
The Commonwealth’s Attorney argued that the concealed carry ban was
permissible because open carry was still lawful. 66 The Kentucky Supreme
Court disagreed. It was true “That the provisions of the act in question do not
import an entire destruction of the right of the citizens to bear arms in defense
of themselves and the state.” 67 However, “[n]ot merely all legislative acts,
which purport to take it away; but all which diminish or impair it as it existed
Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Lit.) 90 (1822). “Bliss appears to be the first appellate
decision construing a state constitutional arms provision.” State v. Christian, 249 Or. App. 1,
38; 274 P.3d 262, 283 (2012) (Edmonds, J., dissenting). The Christian dissent contains a very
thorough analysis of many of the nineteenth century cases. Id. at 32–45. For a careful analysis
of the 1799 Kentucky right to arms, and its successors see Posey v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d
170, 183–203 (Ky. 2006) (Scott, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
64 Bliss, 12 Ky. at 90.
63

65

That any person in this commonwealth who shall hereafter wear a pocket
pistol, dirk, large knife, or sword in a cane, concealed as a weapon, unless when
travelling on a journey, shall be fined in any sum not less than one hundred
dollars; which may be recovered in any court having jurisdiction of like sums,
by action of debt or on the presentment of a grand jury; and a prosecutor in
such presentment shall not be necessary. One half of such fine shall be to the
use of the informer, and the other to the use of this commonwealth.
Bliss, 12 Ky. at 90.
66 Id. at 91.
67 Id.
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when the constitution was formed, are void.” 68 So Bliss’s conviction was
overturned. 69 Bliss is cited in Heller for the principle that the right to arms
includes self-defense, not solely militia service. 70
The Heller Court also cited a Kentucky treatise, for the same individual
right point as Bliss. 71 The Treatise summarized the standard interpretation of
the Statute of Northampton, according to Sir John Knight’s Case, and under
the American right to keep bear arms:
Riding or going armed with dangerous or unusual weapons, is a
crime against the public peace, by terrifying the people of the land
.... But here it should be remembered, that in this country the
constitution guarranties to all persons the right to bear arms;
then it can only be a crime to exercise this right in such a manner,
as to terrify the people unnecessarily. 72

B. Tennessee

Simpson v. State (Tenn. 1833). 73 According to the grand jury indictment, on
April 1, 1833, William Simpson, a “laborer,” made an affray on a public street
by carrying arms so as to terrorize the public. 74 Two other people, “A. O., tailor,
and B. O., blacksmith,” were involved in the affray, but were not indicted. 75
The Tennessee Supreme Court of Errors and Appeals ruled the indictment
unconstitutional. 76 The indictment did not specify what Simpson had done.
Merely saying that he had “made an affray” was too general. 77 The common
law crime had to be narrowly construed, and the “affray” had to be described
with particularity, so as not to violate the constitutional right to carry arms. 78
Therefore the conviction was reversed and indictment was quashed. 79 Simpson
is cited in Heller for the same principle as was Bliss. 80
Id. at 92.
Id. at 94.
70 Heller at 585 n.9.
71 Heller, 554 U.S. at 588 n.10.
72 CHARLES HUMPHREYS, A COMPENDIUM OF THE COMMON LAW IN FORCE IN KENTUCKY 482
(Lexington: 1822). The treatise observed, “We have a statute on the subject, relating to
concealed weapons.” Published in 1822, the treatise was apparently written before the 1822
decision in Bliss, holding the Kentucky concealed carry statute unconstitutional.
73 Simpson v. State, 13 Tenn. 356 (1833).
74 “Affray” is “The fighting of two or more persons in some public place to the disturbance
of the people, e.g., where two or more persons voluntarily or by agreement engage in any
fight….” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 56 (5th ed. 1979).
75 Simpson, 13 Tenn. at 361.
76 Id. at 362.
77 Id. at 361.
78 Id. at 359-60.
79 Id. at 362.
80 Heller at 585 n.9.
68
69
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Aymette v. State (Tenn. 1840). 81 Aymette “had fallen out with one
Hamilton.” At
about ten o’clock, p.m., he went in search of him to a hotel,
swearing he would have his heart’s blood. He had a bowie-knife
concealed under his vest and suspended to the waistband of his
breeches, which he took out occasionally and brandished in his
hand. He was put out of the hotel, and proceeded from place to
place in search of Hamilton, and occasionally exhibited his
knife. 82
Aymette was convicted of violating a state statute which prohibited concealed
carrying of Bowie knives. 83 He was sentenced to three months in jail and a
$200 fine. 84
The Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the state statute. It construed the
Tennessee Constitution’s right to arms clause (and by analogy in dicta, the
U.S. Second Amendment) as protecting an “unqualified right” of citizens to
keep arms of types which would be suitable for militia use: those “usually
employed in civilized warfare,” which “constitute the ordinary military
equipment.” 85 In contrast, the right to arms did not encompass weapons “which
are usually employed in private broils, and which are efficient only in the
hands of the robber and the assassin.” 86 The court did not think a bowie knife
was suitable for military use, although the 1836 Texan War of Independence
had already proven that incorrect, and the Civil War would again show the
militia utility of such knives. 87
As for carrying arms, the court said that to “bear” arms meant only to bear
them while serving in the militia and not a general right to carry arms. 88 The
U.S. Supreme Court in Heller expressly rejected Aymette, labeling it an “odd”
decision which nevertheless supported the Heller majority’s view that the

Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840).
Id. at 154.
83 Id. at 154; ACTS PASSED AT THE FIRST SESSION OF THE TWENTY-SECOND GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF TENNESSEE: 1837–8, at 200–01 (Nashville: S. Nye & Co., 1838)
(“that, if any person shall wear any bowie-knife, or Arkansas toothpick, or other knife or
weapon that shall in form, shape, or size resemble a bowie-knife or Arkansas toothpick, under
his clothes, or keep the same concealed about his person, such person shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined in a sum not less than two hundred
dollars, and shall be imprisoned in the county jail not less than three months and not more
than six months.”).
84 Aymette, 21 Tenn. at 154.
85 Id. at 158, 160.
86 Id. at 158.
87 Id. at 158; David B. Kopel, Clayton Cramer & Joseph P. Olson, Knives and the Second
Amendment, 47 MICH. J.L. REFORM 175, 189–90 (2013).
88 Aymette, 21 Tenn. at 161.
81
82
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Second Amendment protects an individual right. 89 The Aymette decision was
not particularly influential in its own time, but became influential in the South
following the Civil War. 90 Several post-Civil War cases adopted the civilized
warfare test: arms suitable for the militia (e.g., rifles, swords, large handguns)
are protected by the right to arms; arms supposedly suitable only for robbers
and assassins (e.g., bowie knives, daggers) are not protected.
Aymette reached its peak of influence in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1939
United States v. Miller. 91 The case involved collusion between the U.S.
Attorney, the U.S. District Court Judge and (perhaps) the defense attorney to
bring a case to the Supreme Court to uphold the National Firearms Act of
1934. 92 Defendants Jack Miller and Frank Layton were career criminals who
had been caught with a sawed-off shotgun, which they had not registered and
for which they had not paid the appropriate tax. 93 The defendants filed no brief
and urged the Court to rely on the government’s brief. 94 Citing Aymette (and
no other case), the Court stated “it is not within judicial notice that this weapon
is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute
to the common defense.” 95 So the Court reversed the district court’s quashing
of the indictment, and remanded the case “for further proceedings.” 96 Layton
pled guilty and was sentenced to probation; Miller was murdered before he
could be reprosecuted. 97
Although Miller did not use the term “civilized warfare,” the case was a
straightforward application of the test that had been used by Aymette and its
successors. 98 However, the test would soon become unusable. During World
War II, a typical American soldier carried a self-loading M1 Garand rifle or M1
Carbine (a shorter, lighter type of rifle). 99 After the war, these firearms became
Heller at 613–14.
Michael P. O’Shea, The Second Amendment Wild Card: The Persisting Relevance of the
“Hybrid” Interpretation of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 81 TENN. L. REV. 597 (2014).
91 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
92 Brian Frye, The Peculiar Story of United States v. Miller, 3 N.Y.U.J.L. & LIBERTY 48
(2008). Cited in Heller at 623 (describing procedural history of the case).
93 Miller at 175; Frye at 52–60.
94 Heller at 623 (citing Frye at 65–68).
95 Miller at 177.
96 Miller at 183. Since the indictment had been quashed before trial, the “further
proceedings” would have been a criminal trial. Although the militia utility of a short shotgun
was not within judicial notice, at a trial the defendants could have introduced evidence to
attempt to prove the weapon’s utility.
97 Frye at 68–69.
98 Michael P. O’Shea, The Second Amendment Wild Card: The Persisting Relevance of the
“Hybrid” Interpretation of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 81 TENN. L. REV. 597 (2014);
Michael P. O’Shea, Modeling the Second Amendment Right to Carry Arms (I): Judicial
Tradition and the Scope of "Bearing Arms" for Self-Defense, 61 AM. U.L. REV. 585 (2012).
99 BRUCE N. CANFIELD, THE M1 GARAND RIFLE (2013); BRUCE N. CANFIELD, BRUCE
CANFIELD’S COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE M1 GARAND AND THE M1 CARBINE (1999); JOEY POYER &
CRAIGH RIESCH, THE M1 GARAND, 1936-1957 (1997); LEROY THOMPSON & PETER DENNIS, THE
M1 CARBINE (2011).
89
90
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mainstream arms for American citizens, partly because the Army’s Civilian
Marksmanship Program put large numbers into citizen hands at steeply
discounted prices. 100 Applying Miller and the civilized warfare test, these arms
would be at the core of Second Amendment protection. This is an
unproblematic result; as the Supreme Court noted in Staples v. United States,
semiautomatic rifles (including the AR-15 at issue in Staples) “traditionally
have been widely accepted as lawful possessions.” 101 As Staples also pointed
out, “machineguns... have the same quasi-suspect character we attributed to
owning hand grenades.” 102
The problem with the “civilized warfare” test is that starting in the Korean
War, the U.S. military began transitioning to automatic firearms (commonly
called “machine guns”). Invented in 1884, automatics had never become
popular with ordinary Americans. 103 For most people, including judges, it was
inconceivable that machine guns would be protected by the core of the Second
Amendment. Consistent with public opinion, District of Columbia v. Heller
recast the right in terms of self-defense, and discarded the civilized warfare
test; under Heller, the paradigmatic Second Amendment arms are those for
ordinary self-defense, not machine guns for warfare. 104
Day v. Tennessee (Tenn. 1857). 105 Richard Day was indicted “for maliciously
drawing a bowie-knife, from a place of concealment about his person, with
intent to awe and intimidate one Sterling T. Bacon.” 106 He was also indicted
for having intended to stab Bacon. Day had been at Bacon’s house; there was
an altercation, and Bacon ordered Day to leave. Day did so. Bacon followed him
to the door-step, with a large bottle in his hand. “[D]efendant approached him
and, laying his left hand upon Bacon’s shoulder, told him not to rush upon him,
at the same time drawing a large knife from beneath his vest, which he held
in his right hand behind him, but made no effort to use.” 107 Day was convicted
by the jury, and sentenced to three years in the penitentiary, the mandatory
minimum.
The court noted the 1838 statute banning the sale or concealed carry of
bowie knives, and the severe penalties. Yet, these laws were “generally
disregarded in our cities and towns.” 108
LARRY L. RUTH, 2 WAR BABY! COMES HOME: THE U.S. CALIBER .30 CARBINE (R. Blake
Stevens ed., 1993); Joseph P. Tartaro, The Great Assault Weapon Hoax, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV.
619, 622 (1995) (“[T]he M1 carbine [is] beloved by millions of war veterans, collectors, and
MARKSMANSHIP
PROGRAM,
recreational
shooters.”);
About
the
CMP,
CIV.
http://thecmp.org/about/.
101 Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 611–12 (1994).
102 Id.
103 JOHN ELLIS, THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE MACHINE GUN 151 (1975)
104 Heller, 554 U.S. at 627.
105 Day v. Tennessee, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 496 (1857).
106 Id. at 496.
107 Id. at 496–97.
108 Id. at 499.
100
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The trial court had instructed the jury that it should convict Day if it found
that he had drawn the bowie knife for self-defense. The Supreme Court
interpreted the statute severely, finding that left no room for self-defense. “We
regret the fate of the defendant, but the law must be enforced against offenders
for the general good.” 109 This was consistent with Aymette’s holding that since
the Tennessee constitutional right to arms referred only to “defence of the
state,” the right did not involve carrying for personal self-defense. 110 Before the
Civil War, Tennessee courts were the only ones to take this position.
Heller, however, takes a much broader view. The Second Amendment
encompasses all legitimate uses of arms:
•
•

•
•
•

“Americans valued the ancient [militia] right; most undoubtedly
thought it even more important for self-defense and hunting.” 111
“[T]he right to keep arms involves, necessarily, the right to use such
arms for all the ordinary purposes, and in all the ordinary modes
usual in the country, and to which arms are adapted, limited by the
duties of a good citizen in times of peace.” 112
“The traditional militia was formed from a pool of men bringing arms
‘in common use at the time’ for lawful purposes like self-defense.” 113
The right applies to arms “typically possessed by law-abiding citizens
for lawful purposes.” 114
While it is agreed that the Second Amendment protects militia use
of arms, “whether it also protects the right to possess and use guns
for nonmilitary purposes like hunting and personal self-defense is
the question presented by this case.” 115

McDonald summarized “our central holding in Heller: that the Second
Amendment protects a personal right to keep and bear arms for lawful
purposes, most notably for self-defense within the home.” 116 While self-defense
in the home is central to the Second Amendment right, it is not the sole purpose
of the right.

C. Alabama

State v. Reid (Ala. 1840). 117 Reid, the Sheriff of Montgomery County, faced
a serious threat arising out of the performance of his official duties:

Id. at 501.
Aymette at 160–61.
111 Heller at 599.
112 Id. at 614 quoting Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165, 178 (1871)).
113 Id. at 624.
114 Id. at 625.
115 Id. at 636–37.
116 McDonald at 780.
117 State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612 (1840).
109
110
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while making a settlement as sheriff, he had been attacked by an
individual of a dangerous and desperate character, who
afterwards threatened his person, and came to his office several
times to look for him. It was also proved, that these threats were
communicated to the defendant, and the pistol brought to him by
a friend, who conceived his life was in danger. 118
Sheriff Reid was convicted of carrying a concealed handgun, and sentenced to
six hours in jail, plus a $50 fine, plus court costs. 119
He argued that the state statute against concealed carry was
unconstitutional. 120 The Alabama Supreme Court decision reflected the strong
judicial sentiment of the day that anyone engaged in concealed carry must be
up to no good; “it is only when carried openly, that they [arms] can be efficiently
used for defence.” 121 Modern experience with state laws which provide for fair
and objective standards for the issuance of concealed carry permits plainly
disprove the Alabama court’s assertion. There are many instances in which
concealed carry permitees have used their concealed handguns for lawful selfdefense against violent attackers. 122
The Reid court cautioned that any “statute which, under the pretence of
regulating, amounts to a destruction of the right, or which requires arms to be
so borne as to render them wholly useless for the purpose of defence, would be
clearly unconstitutional.” 123 On the particular facts involving Sheriff Reid,
however, the court pointed out that
There was no evidence adduced, tending to show that the
defendant could not have defended himself as successfully, by
carrying the pistol openly, as by secreting it about his person: it
is difficult to conceive, how one could be placed in such an
attitude, consistently with the law which recognizes the right of
self-protection. 124
Besides, Reid had the power as Sheriff to summon the posse comitatus (ablebodied and armed men of the county) to help him enforce the law. 125
Id. at 612–13.
Id. at 612.
120 ACTS PASSED AT THE ANNUAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF
ALABAMA (Tuscaloosa: Hale & Eaton, 1838 [1839]), chap. 77, 67-68.
121 Reid, 1 Ala. at 619 (brackets added).
122 E.g., CLAYTON CRAMER, TOUGH TARGETS: WHEN CRIMINALS FACE ARMED RESISTANCE
FROM CITIZENS (2012). For a list of some defensive gun use cases see http://www.cato.org/gunsand-self-defense/.
123 Reid, 1 Ala. at 616–17.
124 Reid, 1 Ala. at 621.
125 Id. at 621–22. For more on the posse as a past and present institution subject to the
summons of a Sheriff, see David B. Kopel, The Posse Comitatus and the Office of Sheriff: Armed
Citizens Summoned to the Aid of Law Enforcement, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 671 (2015)
118
119
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The court acknowledged the theoretical possibility that some other person
might be able to show sufficient facts as to why concealed carry, rather than
open carry, was necessary for that person—although the court was skeptical
that such a situation could really exist. 126
Reid is twice cited with approval in Heller for the principle that there is an
individual right to carry arms, and that the legislature may not destroy the
right under the pretense of regulation. 127 Reid’s approach to concealed carry
was also followed not only by Heller, but also by the 1897 U.S. Supreme Court
case Robertson v. Baldwin. 128 Interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment’s
prohibition on “involuntary servitude,” 129 the Court held that a merchant
seaman who deserted could be forced back into service; the Court reasoned that
all constitutional rights had implicit exceptions. For example, the First
Amendment does not prohibit punishment for libel; the Fifth Amendment’s
Double Jeopardy clause does not prohibit a second prosecution if the first jury
cannot reach a verdict. 130 Likewise, the Second Amendment “is not infringed
by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons.” 131

D. Arkansas

State v. Buzzard (Ark. 1842). 132 Buzzard was indicted for violating the
Arkansas statute against concealed carry. 133 The Circuit Court judge quashed
the indictment on grounds that the statute violated the right to arms. 134 By a
2-1 decision, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed. 135 The opinion for the
court by Chief Justice Ringo held that the concealed carry statute was a
legitimate regulation of the right to arms. 136 A concurring opinion introduced
(describing Sheriffs’ use of posses, from ancient England to modern Colorado).
126 Reid, 1 Ala. at 622.
127 Heller at 585 n.9, 629.
128 Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
129 U.S. CONST., amend. XIII, § 1.
130 Robertson at 281-82.
131 Id.
An 1856 Alabama statute made it illegal to “sell, or give, or lend, to any male minor” a
pistol, air gun, bowie knife “or knife of the like kind or description.” No. 26, 1855–56 Ala. Laws
17 (Feb. 2, 1856). The statute has obvious constitutional problems, but those were not raised
by the defendant in Coleman v. State, 32 Ala. 581 (1858). There, the court simply found that
Coleman’s conduct came within the scope of “lend.” Coleman was a storekeeper who let his
nephew take a pistol that Coleman was storing for another man. Id.
132 State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842).
133 Id. at 18, citing REV. STATS. ARK., Div. VIII, Ch. 44, at 280 (“every person who shall
wear any pistol, dirk, butcher or large knife, or a sword in a cane, concealed as a weapon,
unless upon a journey, shall be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor.”).
134 Buzzard, 4 Ark. at 18–19.
135 Id. at 28, 33.
136 Id. at 27 (“The act in question does not, in my judgment, detract anything from the
power of the people to defend their free state and the established institutions of the country.
It inhibits only the wearing of certain arms concealed. This is simply a regulation as to the
manner of bearing such arms as are specified.”).
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into American law the notion that the Second Amendment and its Arkansas
analogue are not individual rights, but merely affirmations of government
power over the militia. 137 This new theory was not heard of again until a 1905
Kansas Supreme Court decision. 138

E. North Carolina

State v. Huntly (N.C. 1843). 139 According to the indictment, Robert S.
Huntly, a “laborer,” on September 1, 1843, armed himself “with pistols, guns,
knives and other dangerous and unusual weapons,” exhibited his arms openly
during day and night on a public highway of Anson, N.C., and declared his
intent “to beat, wound, kill and murder” James H. Ratcliff. 140 The dispute
between Huntly and Ratcliff involved some slaves, which Huntly demanded
that Ratcliff turn over to him. 141 Huntly was convicted of the common law
offense derived from the Statute of Northampton, namely of going armed in
public with the purpose of terrifying the public.
The North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the conviction, while adding a
reminder that gun carrying in itself was lawful. According to the Court, “No
man amongst us carries it [a gun] about with him, as one of his every day
accoutrements--as a part of his dress.” 142 The Court hoped that this would
never change. 143 Even so,
[I]t is to be remembered that the carrying of a gun per se
constitutes no offence. For any lawful purpose—either of business
or amusement—the citizen is at perfect liberty to carry his gun.
It is the wicked purpose—and the mischievous result—which
essentially constitute the crime. He shall not carry about this or
any other weapon of death to terrify and alarm, and in such
manner as naturally will terrify and alarm, a peaceful people. 144

Buzzard at 32–33 (Dickinson, J., concurring.)
Salina v. Blaksly, 72 Kan. 230, 83 P. 619 (1905); David B. Kopel, The Second
Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1359. The Kansas Court went far
out of its way to nullify the state and federal right to arms. Neither party had made a right to
arms argument. Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms: Does the Constitution or the Predilection
of Judges Reign? 36 OKLA. L. REV. 65, 77 (1983).
139 State v. Huntly, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 418 (1843).
For analysis of the North Carolina right, see Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right to Bear Arms
in the First State Bills of Rights: Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Vermont, and Massachusetts,
10 VT. L. REV. 314 (1985); Carl W. Thurman, III, Note, State v. Fennell: The North Carolina
Tradition of Reasonable Regulation of the Right to Bear Arms, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1078 (1990).
140 Huntly, 25 N.C. at 418–19.
141 Id. at 419.
142 Id. at 422.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 422–23.
137
138
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Heller cites Huntley for its “broad public-safety understanding” of the scope of
the individual right to arms, as a right not solely for the militia. 145
Heller at 586 n.9, 601. Patrick Charles argues that Huntly “provides substantiated
evidence that the tenets of the Statute of Northampton survived well into the nineteenth
century.” Charles, supra, at 36. This is true in one narrow sense. The North Carolina
legislature in 1838 had declared that no English statute had any continuing legal effect in the
state. Huntly at 420. However, the Huntly court found that the common law prohibition
against carrying arms in a threatening manner (as Huntly had done), still had force in the
state. Id. at 420–21. This was consistent with Sir John Knight’s Case, which said that the
legality of carrying arms depended on whether the manner was maliciously calculated to
terrify the public. Text at notes supra.
Charles, however, goes further, and argues that Huntly indicates that carrying arms for
self-defense was unlawful. Charles at 37. He bases this argument on the Huntly court’s
statement that arms carrying is a constitutional right, for “any lawful purpose—either of
business or amusement.” Id.; Huntly at 422. According to Charles, “business or amusement”
does not include self-defense. Charles at 37. This is a strained and narrow reading overlooks
the phrase that “business or amusement” was a legal term of art, to encompass all activity.
That was how Chief Justice Marshall used the phrase. See The Schooner Exchange v.
Mcfaddon & Others, 7 Cranch 116 (1812) (“the ports of a nation are open to the private and
public ships of a friendly power, whose subjects have also liberty without special license, to
enter the country for business or amusement…”); Johnson v. Tompkins, 13 F. Cas. 840, No.
741 (Baldwin, Circuit Justice, Cir. Ct. E.D. Penn. 1833) (“any traveller who comes into
Pennsylvania upon a temporary excursion for business or amusement”); Baxter v. Taber. 4
Mass. 361, 367 (1808) (“he may live with his family, and pursue his business, or amusements,
at his pleasure, either on land or water…”); Respublica v. Richards, 2 U.S. 224 (Penn. 1795)
(same language as Johnson v. Tompkins).
Charles also cites a nineteenth century English treatise as demonstrating the acceptance
of a restrictive interpretation of the Statute of Northampton in nineteenth century America.
Charles at 40 n.211 (in section on “The Statute of Northampton in Nineteenth Century
America”) (citing the treatise by Sir William Oldnall Russell). This overlooks the fact that the
American reprint of Russell’s English text explained “for through there is much statute law
inapplicable to this country, yet the cases decided on the construction of these statutes are
very interesting…”). G.S. Advertisement to the Ninth American Edition, in 1 WILLIAM OLDNALL
RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS vii (9th Amer. ed., Phil., T. & J. W.
Johnson & Co.1877).
More to the point on American law, Charles cites Chancellor Kent. Charles at 40, n.212.
But although Charles says that Kent was expressing “the legal tenets imbedded in the Statute
of Northampton,” the quoted text is simply Kent urging a prohibition on “the practice of
carrying concealed weapons.” Id. Notably, Charles is quoting Kent’s eighth edition, from 1854,
about laws which “would be very desirable.” This indicates that Kent did not consider laws
against concealed to be the rule in most states. To the contrary, on the very page cited by
Charles, Kent wrote:
145

As to the Constitution of the United States, and the constitution of several of
the states, in terms more or less comprehensive, declare the right of the people
to keep and bear arms, it has been a subject of grave discussion, in some of the
state courts, whether a statute probibiting persons, when not on a journey, or
as travellers, from wearing or carrying concealed weapons, be constitutional.
There has been a great difference of opinion on the question.
JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *405–06 note a (8th ed., N.Y., William Kent
1854). At the end of the footnote is sentence quoted by Charles, urging the desirability of
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State v. Newson (N.C. 1844). 146 Elijah Newsom, “a free person of color,” was
convicted by a jury of carrying a shotgun without having obtained a license
from Cumberland County’s Court of Pleas and Quarter Sessions. 147 This
violated an 1841 state statute barring free people of color from possessing
firearms without a license. 148 The Superior Court judge arrested the judgment
of conviction because the statute was unconstitutional. 149
The North Carolina Supreme Court ruled the statute consistent with
longstanding state laws which had imposed disabilities on the free black
population, such as a 1777 statute prohibiting “colored persons within the
fourth degree from being heard as witnesses against a white man.” Similarly,
an 1835 state constitutional amendment had stripped voting rights from free
blacks. The decision of the court below was reversed. 150

F. Georgia

Nunn v. State (Ga. 1846). 151 Nunn was prosecuted for violating an 1837
statute which banned sale, possession, and carrying of all handguns, except
“horsemen’s pistols.” 152 After conviction, he appealed to the Georgia Supreme
Court, which reversed his conviction and quashed the proceeding.
The court ruled that insofar as the 1837 statute banned concealed carry, it
was constitutional, but the indictment had not charged that Nunn had carried

prohibiting concealed arms. The full footnote from Kent thus demonstrates the opposite of
Charles’s theory that the 1328 Statute of Northampton prohibited all defensive arms carrying
(open or concealed) in nineteenth century America.
146 State v. Newsom, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 250 (1844).
147 Id. at 250–51.
148 An Act to prevent Free Persons of Colour from carrying Fire-arms, ch. 30, 1840-1841
N.C. Laws 61 (Jan. 11, 1841).
149 Newsom, 25 N.C. at 251.
150 Id. at 252–54.
There are other cases from the antebellum period involving firearms disabilities (either
bans or licensing statutes) for slaves and for free persons of color, since such persons had few
if any constitutional rights. E.g., Aldridge v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. 447, 449 (Gen. Ct. 1824)
(noting the many restrictions on free blacks, including “upon their right to bear arms”). Waters
v. State, 1 Gill 302, 309 (Md. 1843) (among the many restrictions on free blacks are laws “to
make it unlawful for them to bear arms”). Both Aldridge and Waters were cited in Heller for
recognition that the right to arms is an individual right, not for militia only. Heller at 611–12.
These laws are of course no legitimate precedent for modern gun control; they exemplify the
error of depriving persons of constitutional rights because of race or similar characteristics.
In dissent, Justice Stevens argued the Aldridge quote might have referred only to blacks
being forbidden to bear arms when they were serving in the state militia. Id. at 662 n.29
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia replied that blacks had been excluded from the Virginia
militia for thirty years before Aldridge was decided. Id. at 612 n.21 (maj. op.)
151 Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846).
152 ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA PASSED IN MILLEDGEVILLE
AT AN ANNUAL SESSION IN NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER, 1837, 90-91 (Milledgeville: P. L.
Robinson, 1838) (“An Act to guard and protect the citizens of this State against the
unwarrantable and too prevalent use of deadly weapons”).
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his handguns concealed. 153 The ban on open carry of handguns was
unconstitutional. 154 So was the handgun ban, and the fact that horse pistols
were still allowed did not save it. 155
The Heller Court applauded Nunn because it “perfectly captured” the
relationship between the first and second parts of the Second Amendment. 156
The longest block quote in Heller is from Nunn:
The right of the whole people, old and young, men, women and
boys, and not militia only, to keep and bear arms of every
description, and not such merely as are used by the militia, shall
not be infringed, curtailed, or broken in upon, in the smallest
degree; and all this for the important end to be attained: the
rearing up and qualifying a well-regulated militia, so vitally
necessary to the security of a free State. Our opinion is, that any
law, State or Federal, is repugnant to the Constitution, and void,
which contravenes this right, originally belonging to our
forefathers, trampled under foot by Charles I. and his two wicked
sons and successors, re-established by the revolution of 1688,
conveyed to this land of liberty by the colonists, and finally
incorporated conspicuously in our own Magna Charta! 157
As of 1846, there was no right to arms in the Georgia Constitution. 158
Notwithstanding Barron v. Baltimore, 159 the Nunn court ruled that the Second
Amendment did apply to the Georgia state courts:
The language of the second amendment is broad enough to
embrace both Federal and State governments-nor is there
anything in its terms which restricts its meaning…..[D]oes it
follow that because the people refused to delegate to the general
government the power to take from them the right to keep and
bear arms, that they designed to rest it in the State governments?
Is this a right reserved to the States or to themselves? Is it not an
Nunn, 1 Ga. at 250.
Id.
155 Id. at 247. “Horse pistols” were large handguns, usually sold in a pair, along with a
double holster that was meant to be draped over a saddle. They were too large for practical
carry by a person who was walking. Lewis & Clark Fort Mandan Foundation, Horse Pistols,
http://www.lewis-clark.org/content/content-article.asp?ArticleID=2380.
156 Heller at 612.
157 Nunn at 251 (emphasis in original); Heller at 612–13.
158 In 1865, a new Georgia Constitution copied the Second Amendment verbatim. GA.
CONST., art. I, § 4 (1865). The current version states: “The right of the people to keep and bear
arms shall not be infringed, but the General Assembly shall have to prescribe the manner in
which arms may be borne.” GA. CONST., art. I, § 1 ¶VIII (1983) (retaining language adopted in
1877).
159 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
153
154
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unalienable right, which lies at the bottom of every free
government? We do not believe that, because the people withheld
this arbitrary power of disfranchisement from Congress, they
ever intended to confer it on the local legislatures. This right is
too dear to be confided to a republican legislature. 160
As the Nunn court acknowledged, the U.S. Supreme Court had held that
Bill of Rights was only a limit on the federal government. 161 But many state
judges considered Barron to be authoritative only for federal courts. State
supreme courts, on this view, were still free to enforce the Bill of Rights.
Significantly, under the federal Judiciary Act of 1789, the U.S. Supreme Court
had jurisdiction to review cases in which a state court had found a state law to
be constitutional, but not to review cases in which a state court found a state
law to violate the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court was not granted
power over the latter class of cases until the early twentieth century. 162 There
were dozens of state cases applying parts of the federal Bill of Rights to states;
Nunn cited the grand-daddy of them all, People v. Goodwin, in which New
York’s highest court applied the rule against Double Jeopardy to state and local
action. 163 Nunn itself became a leading case in this line, although it had plenty
of company. 164
After the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, in part for
the purpose of overturning two Supreme Court decisions. One was Barron,
with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause being
Nunn, 1 Ga. at 250 (emphasis in original). Cf. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798) (ex
post facto laws are necessarily illegal, and not true laws, regardless of whether a constitution
specifically prohibits them).
As noted by Justice Thomas in his McDonald concurrence, two years later the Georgia
Court stated that “[f]ree persons of color have never been recognized here as citizens; they are
not entitled to bear arms”. 561 U.S. at 849 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Cooper v.
Savannah, 4 Ga. 68, 72 (1848)). Cooper freed prisoners who had been imprisoned and then
hired out for not paying a $100 tax required for free persons of color who moved to the city.
Imprisonment and forced servitude for non-payment of taxes “is repugnant to the laws of the
State,” the Court ruled. 4 Ga. at 74.
161 Nunn, 1 Ga. at 250; Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
162 See McDonald at 842–43 (Thomas, J., concurring); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 145–56 (1998) (discussing ‘‘the Barron contrarians’’); Jason Mazzone, The Bill of Rights
in Early State Courts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2007). As examples of antebellum state courts
applying the Bill of Rights to the states, Justice Thomas cited, inter alia, Nunn, State v.
Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 28 (1842); State v. Jumel, 13 La. Ann. 399, 400 (1858); and Cockrum v.
State, 24 Tex. 394, 401–404 (1859). McDonald at 843 n.16. These other three cases are
discussed at -------.
163 Nunn at 250 (citing People v. Goodwin, 18 Johns. Rep. 187, 200, 1 Wheeler C.C. 470, 9
Am. Dec. 203 (N.Y. 1820)).
164 See Mazzone at 35–54 (citing dozens of cases for the Fourth Amendment; about a dozen
for Fifth Amendment takings; seven for Double Jeopardy; a half-dozen for Due Process or Selfincrimination; five for the Sixth Amendment; one for First Amendment religion; and four for
the Seventh Amendment).
160
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intended to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states. 165 The other was
Dred Scott; it had held that Blacks are not citizens of the United States, and
warned that a contrary result would mean that Blacks could “keep and carry
arms wherever they went.” 166 The citizenship clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment reversed Dred Scott’s citizenship rule. 167

G. Louisiana

State v. Chandler (La. 1850). 168 Like Georgia, Louisiana did not have an
enumerated state constitutional right to arms before the Civil War. 169 So like
the Georgia Supreme Court, the Louisiana Supreme Court treated the Second
Amendment as enforceable in state courts.
Chandler was convicted in New Orleans for manslaughter of Patrick C.
Daley, on Oct. 7, 1848. 170 On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed,
because the trial judge had prevented the jury from hearing all the facts. 171 By
Chandler’s account, “Daley actually attacked Chandler, and was beating his
head against a brick wall so as to put his life really in danger, and Chandler
then killed his assailant from absolute necessity to preserve his own life.” 172
The prosecution, though, had contended that “Daley was unarmed and sick,
and only in consequence of a quarrel with Chandler’s wife the preceding
evening, the latter was so enraged that he rushed upon and gave him four stabs
with a Bowie knife, until then concealed in his bosom–Daley being a perfectly
passive victim.” 173
Also, the judge had instructed the jury, “I have rarely known a case in which
the crime of murder was more clearly brought home to the prisoner, and I
cannot think you can entertain any reasonable doubt of his guilt.” 174 But this
was deemed harmless, since the jury only convicted for manslaughter. 175
The court had no trouble upholding Louisiana’s statute against concealed
carry. 176 Open carry “places men upon an equality. This is the right guaranteed
McDonald v. Chicago (Thomas, J., concurring).
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 417 (1857).
167 McDonald at 807–08 (Thomas, J., concurring).
168 State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489 (1850).
169 The first Louisiana right to arms provision was adopted in LA. CONST., art. 3 (1879)
(copying the Second Amendment, and adding a sentence allowing punishment for carrying
concealed weapons). The current provision states: “The right of each citizen to keep and bear
arms is fundamental and shall not be infringed. Any restriction on this right shall be subject
to strict scrutiny.” LA. CONST., art I, § 11 (amended 2012)
170 Chandler, 5 La. Ann. at 489.
171 Id. at 490.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Act of Mar. 25, 1813, making it a misdemeanor to be “found with a concealed weapon,
such as a dirk, dagger, knife, pistol, or any other deadly weapon concealed in his bosom, coat,
or any other place about him, that does not appear in full open view.”
165
166
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by the Constitution of the United States, and which is calculated to incite men
to a manly and noble defence of themselves, if necessary, and of their country,
without any tendency to secret advantages and unmanly assassinations.” 177
The record does not indicate that Chandler was actually convicted of violating
the concealed carry statute, but apparently his violation was used as evidence
of his nefarious intent in the homicide case against him.
Starting with North Dakota in 1923, states would begin formalizing this
approach, adopting statutes that in a prosecution for a violent crime, the
defendant’s carrying of a concealed handgun without a carry permit was prima
facie evidence of intent to use the handgun in the crime. 178 The statute was a
model law, originally known at the Revolver Association Act, since it was
proposed by the United States Revolver Association, as an alternative to the
New York State 1911 law which required a permit to purchase or possess a
handgun. Soon, the Revolver Association Act was adopted, with revisions, by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and
became known as the Uniform Firearms Act. 179
Chandler is thrice cited with approval in Heller, for the principle that the
individual right to arms includes the right to open carry. 180 In opposition to
Tennessee’s Aymette, Chandler holds that the Second Amendment protects the
right to carry arms in public (not just during militia service), and that bowie
knives are among the arms protected by the Second Amendment. 181
State v. Smith (La. 1856). 182 Smith was convicted of carrying a concealed
pistol. 183 It was undisputed that the pistol in his pocket was “partially
exposed.” 184 The Louisiana Supreme Court reaffirmed that the concealed carry
statute does not violate the Second Amendment. The court ruled that “partial
concealment of the weapon” because of “want of capacity in the pocket to
contain, or clothes fully to cover the weapon” violated the statute. 185 This was
contrasted with the lawful “carrying of such weapon in full open view, and
partially covered by the pocket or clothes.” 186
The above standard is confusing. The issue of partial concealment continues
to arise today. All but a few states today have objective licensing systems, by
which law-abiding, trained adults can obtain concealed carry permits. But
what if the handgun, which by law must be concealed, is momentarily exposed?
Id.
Uniform Firearms Act (1926), § 2; David B. Kopel, Background Checks for Firearms
Sales and Loans: Law, History, and Policy, 53 HARV. J. LEGISL. (2015, forthcoming),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2665432.
179 Kopel, Background Checks, at ___.
180 Heller at 586 n.9, 613, 626.
181 Chandler, 5 La. Ann. at 490–91. Chandler’s arm was a bowie knife. Id. at 491.
182 State v. Smith, 11 La. Ann. 633 (1856).
183 Id. at 633.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
177
178
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For example, it is worn in a holster inside the waistband, on the back; when
the licensee bends over, her shirt rises up, and a small portion of the handgun
is momentarily revealed? Or some other extended movement makes the gun
“print,” so that its outline is visible through clothing? People get prosecuted
and convicted for such offenses, and legislatures sometimes refine their
statutes to make it clear that transient exposure does not violate the
requirement that the handgun be carried concealed. 187 To address the problem,
some states enacted statutes specifying that carrying a gun in an exposed
holster on the belt is still considered “open” carry, even though the holster will
necessarily obscure a portion of the gun. 188
State v. Jumel (La. 1858). 189 Jumel was convicted of violating the latest
version of Louisiana’s concealed carry statute, which had been enacted in
1855. 190 The Louisiana Supreme Court speedily disposed of his appeal, citing
Chandler and Smith: “The statute in question does not infringe the right of the
people to keep or bear. It is a measure of police, prohibiting only a particular
mode of bearing arms which is found dangerous to the peace of society.” 191

Mississippi used to ban carrying a handgun concealed, “in whole or in part.” One judge
noted the overbreadth of this language: “Conceivably, carrying a revolver suspended from the
neck by a leather throng could be partially concealing it.” L.M., Jr. v. State, 600 So.2d 967, 971
(Miss. 1992) (Lee, C.J., concurring). In 2013, Mississippi added clarifying language. In the
statute against carrying a concealed handgun without a license, “‘concealed’ means hidden or
obscured from common observation and shall not include…a loaded or unloaded pistol carried
upon the person in a sheath, belt holster or shoulder holster that is wholly or partially visible,
or carried upon the person in a scabbard or case for carrying the weapon that is wholly or
partially visible.” Miss. Code § 97-37-1(4); Miss. House Bill 2 (2013).
Virginia’s regulations on “concealed” carry have been judicially interpreted to apply only
when the arm is .“hidden from all except those with an unusual or exceptional opportunity to
view it.” Main v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 370, 372 (Va. App. 1995) (en banc). This would
include a handgun “in one’s back pocket … if the handle of the weapon, the only part of the
weapon extending outside of the pocket, is concealed by [a] duffle bag.” Id. 371–73. “Concealed”
also encompassed a “handgun in a pocket compartment in the fabric covering the back of the
passenger's seat” of an automobile, which a police officer only saw when he peered “down into
the seat’s pocket compartment from directly above.” Clarke v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App.
286, 303 (Va. App. 2000). Something that was not “concealed” was a knife “sticking one-half to
three-quarters of an inch out of [one’s] right back pants pocket,” even though the small amount
of visible handle did not immediately indicate that the item was a knife. Richards v.
Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 242 (Va. App.1994).
188 For an early example, see California’s version of the Revolver Association Act/Uniform
Firearms Act: An act to control and regulate the possession, sale and use of pistols, revolvers
and other firearms capable of being concealed upon the person…., Ch. 339, §5, 1923 Cal. Stat.
695, 697 (June 13, 1923) (No concealed permit needed for handguns “carried openly in a belt
holster” or “knives which are carried openly in sheaths suspended from the waist of the
wearer.”).
189 State v. Jumel, 13 La. Ann. 399 (1858).
190 Act of March 14th, 1855, § 115, (Sess. Acts, p. 148).
191 Jumel, 13 La. Ann. at 399.
187
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H. Texas

Cockrum v. State (Tex. 1859). 192 A Texas statute provided that if a person
convicted of manslaughter had used a “bowie-knife or dagger,” the jury could
impose the maximum non-capital sentence: solitary confinement for life. 193
Cockrum’s conviction was reversed because of defective jury instructions. 194
The Texas Supreme Court addressed other issues that Cockrum had raised on
appeal, since they would be necessary for his retrial. 195
The Texas Constitution right to arms included the right to carry bowie
knives, said the court. 196 However, the sentencing enhancement did not violate
the right, because of the bowie knife was “the most deadly of all weapons in
common use.” 197
The right to arms included the legitimate use, not the abuse, of weapons.
The constitutional limit on punishing abuse was that “the legislature could not
affix such a punishment to the abuse, as, in its nature, must deter the citizen
from its lawful exercise; for that would be tantamount to its prohibition.” 198
The enhanced sentencing statute did not transgress this rule. 199
The Texas enhanced sentencing statue is an example of a traditional,
longstanding gun control that does not violate the right to arms. Today,
enhanced sentencing for use of a firearm in a violent crime is widespread in
state and federal law. The first model legislation with this rule was the
Revolver Association Act from the 1920s, which subsequently became the
Uniform Firearms Act. 200
Other antebellum courts made the same point as Texas. The Missouri
Supreme Court in State v. Schoultz wrote that “the right to bear does not
Cockrum v. State, 24 Tex. 394 (1859).
Id. at 397.
194 Id. at 400.
195 Id. at 401.
196 Id. For analysis of all the right to arms cases in Texas, see Stephen Halbrook, The Right
to Bear Arms in Texas: The Intent of the Framers of the Bill of Rights, 41 BAYLOR L. REV. 629
(1989).
192
193

197

It is an exceedingly destructive weapon. It is difficult to defend against it, by
any degree of bravery, or any amount of skill. The gun or pistol may miss its
aim, and when discharged, its dangerous character is lost, or diminished at
least. The sword may be parried. With these weapons men fight for the sake of
the combat, to satisfy the laws of honor, not necessarily with the intention to
kill, or with a certainty of killing, when the intention exists. The bowie-knife
differs from these in its device and design; it is the instrument of almost certain
death. He who carries such a weapon, for lawful defence, as he may, makes
himself more dangerous to the rights of others, considering the frailties of
human nature, than if he carried a less dangerous weapon.
Cockrum, 24 Tex. at 402–03.
198 Id. at 394.
199 Id.
200 Uniform Firearms Act § 3 (1926); Kopel, Background Checks, supra.
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sanction an unlawful use of arms.” 201 The point was used by analogy in cases
upholding libel prosecutions—which by the courts’ analysis involved a
defendant who misused the First Amendment to harm someone else. 202
Heller cited with approval the following cases, discussed above: Bliss (Ky.
1822), Simpson (Tenn. 1833), Reid (Ala. 1840), Huntly (N.C. (1843), Nunn
(1846), Chandler (La. 1850), and Schoultz (Mo. 1857), and also cited the libel
cases. The only antebellum case the Court specifically declared to be wrong
was Aymette (Tenn. 1840). 203
Collectively, the cases show the mainstream antebellum view on the right
to arms: concealed carry in public may be banned, as long as open carry is
allowed; bans on particular arms are impermissible (except under the
disfavored jurisprudence of Tennessee); however, enhanced sentencing may be
applied to violent crimes involving especially deadly arms; misuse of the right,
by using arms to commit a violent crime, may be punished; the right belongs
to all Americans who are entitled to the ordinary scope of civil rights.

III. Gun Litigation during Reconstruction and Jim Crow
Things changed drastically in the South during Reconstruction. Then they
changed back. As Reconstruction gave way to Jim Crow, courts became
increasingly tolerant of gun control. Heller and McDonald looked to
State v. Shoultz, 25 Mo. 128, 155 (1857).
“The liberty of the press was to be unrestrained, but he who used it was to be responsible
in case of its abuse; like the right to keep fire arms, which does not protect him who uses them
for annoyance or destruction.” Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304, 314 (1825),
cited in Heller at 602.
As stated by the Territorial Supreme Court of Michigan:
201
202

The constitution of the United States also grants to the citizen the right to keep
and bear arms. But the grant of this privilege cannot be construed into the
right in him who keeps a gun to destroy his neighbor. No rights are intended
to be granted by the constitution for an unlawful or unjustifiable purpose.
United States v. Sheldon, 1829 WL 3021 (Terr. Mich. 1829) (also in 5 TRANSACTIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 337, 346 (W. Blume ed.1940). The block quote
above is quoted in Heller at 612.
203 The Court also cited State v. Dempsey, 31 N.C. 384, 385 (1849) for the fact that “keep
arms” encompassed the keeping of arms by persons who were not in the militia. Heller at 583
n.7. Dempsey involved the application of the North Carolina statute, discussed above at ----,
requiring that a person of color must have a licenses in order “to carry about his person or keep
in his house” any arms. Dempsey at 385. Other than the quote from the statute, Dempsey has
no contribution to arms rights jurisprudence; the case is entirely about whether Dempsey falls
with the statutory definition of “persons of mixed blood,” based on a fourth generation ancestor.
Id. at 386-88.
As discussed infra, the court also cited four other cases which briefly mentioned arms laws
or arms rights. See text at notes -----. These cases were cited to illustrate for the basic point
that the Second Amendment is a general individual right to possess and carry weapons. They
do not tell us a great deal beyond this basic point.
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Reconstruction for interpretive guidance about the Second Amendment. 204
They did not look for guidance from cases or statutes from the postReconstruction Jim Crow era.
Based on Heller and McDonald, some of these cases described in this Part
III demonstrate an incorrect understanding of the right to arms; for example,
some uphold bans on the majority of handguns. Many of the cases from this
period may be analogized to the cases in this period upholding censorship laws,
which violated the First Amendment, as detailed by David Rabban’s excellent
Free Speech in its Forgotten Years, 1870-1920. 205

A. Mississippi

After the Confederate army surrendered at Appomattox, state legislatures
in the ex-Confederate states began to address the new reality. They accepted
the national consensus that de jure slavery was finished. But many
Southerners wanted to keep the freedmen in a state of de facto servitude. So
ex-confederate states enacted Black Codes, modeled after the Slave Codes,
restricting or prohibiting the freedmen from exercising many rights of
citizenship. For example, Alabama forbade people of color to possess arms,
while Mississippi and Florida only allowed them to do so if they received a
license. 206 These actions outraged Congress, which in 1866 passed the Second
Freedmen’s Bureau Bill (applying only to states under military rule), ordering
the Union commanders in the South to protect the rights of freedmen,
including “the constitutional right to bear arms.” 207
At nearly the same time, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866
(applying nationally). Its sponsor, Senate Judiciary Chairman Lyman
Trumbull also had written the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill. 208 He explained that
Heller at 614-16; McDonald at 561 U.S. 742, 771–81; 827–50 (Thomas, J., concurring)
DAVID RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS, 1870-1920 (1999). For analysis
of the poor jurisprudence and negative effects of Jim Crow gun control, see Robert J. Cottrol
& Raymond T. Diamond, “Never Intended to be Applied to the White Population”: Firearms
Regulation and Racial Disparity--The Redeemed South’s Legacy to a National Jurisprudence?,
70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1307 (1995).
206 See An Act prescribing additional penalties for the commission of offenses against the
State and for other purposes, ch. 1,466, no. 3, § 12, 1865 Laws of Fla. 25, 27 (Dec. 18, 1865)
(“[I]t shall not be lawful for any negro, mulatto, or other person of color, to own, use or keep in
his possession or under his control, any Bowieknife, dirk, sword, fire-arms or ammunition of
any kind.” Licenses could be issued by probate judges, based on “the recommendation of two
respectable citizens of the county certifying the peaceful and orderly character of the
applicant.” Punishment was forfeiture of the arms, along with 39 lashes or an hour in the
pillory.); An Act to punish certain Offences therein named, and for other purposes, ch. 23, §1,
1865 Miss. Laws 165, 165-66 (Nov. 29, 1865) (regular session) (requiring license from the
county board of police); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1838 (Apr. 7, 1866) (denouncing
Alabama law forbidding arms possession by freedmen).
207 14 Stat. 173 (1866), § 14.
208 He sponsored the First Bill, which was vetoed. The Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill was
based on the first, and was enacted after Congress overrode President Johnson’s veto.
204
205
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the Civil Rights Act would eradicate the anti-gun laws of the exConfederacy. 209 But the Civil Rights Act rested on constitutionally
questionable grounds. Trumbull and others argued that it could be based on
Congress’s enforcement power under section two of the Thirteenth
Amendment; by this theory, Congress could enact any legislation “appropriate”
to safeguard the full civil freedom of the freedmen. 210 Since Trumbull himself
had written the Thirteenth Amendment, 211 this was not an implausible
argument.
However, U.S. Rep. Jonathan Bingham, who strongly favored the objectives
of the Civil Rights Act, doubted that the Thirteenth Amendment provided a
basis for enacting most of it. 212 Shortly thereafter, Bingham introduced the
Fourteenth Amendment, in part to put the Civil Rights Act on a more secure
constitutional footing. 213 Ratification was completed in 1868, and Congress
then reenacted the Civil Rights Act. But the first cases involving the Civil
Rights Act arose before the Fourteenth Amendment had been ratified.
In November 1866, the Mississippi High Court of Errors and Appeals ruled
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 unconstitutional, in a case involving the state’s
arms restrictions on freedmen. James Lewis, a former slave, had been
convicted of carrying a firearm without a license from the county board of
police—in violation of the 1865 gun control law for blacks. 214 Pursuant to the
statute, he was fined one dollar, and ordered to pay court costs. Being unable
to afford to do so, he was jailed for five days, and would then be hired out as a
servant to whomever would pay the fine and costs for him. 215
He appealed, and no brief was filed by the prosecutor. Nevertheless, the
opinion by Chief Justice Handy upheld the conviction. 216 Lewis had argued
that, now being free, he was a citizen of Mississippi, and entitled to the right
to bear arms guaranteed by the Mississippi Constitution. 217 Chief Justice
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474–75 (Jan. 29, 1866).
Id. at 475.
211 MARK K. KRUG, LYMAN TRUMBULL: CONSERVATIVE RADICAL 218 (1965); RALPH J. ROSKE,
HIS OWN COUNSEL: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LYMAN TRUMBULL 106–07 (1979); HORACE WHITE,
THE LIFE OF LYMAN TRUMBULL 227 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1913).
212 CONG. GLOBE 1866, 1293.
213 For details on the repeatedly-expressed intent of Congress to use the Freedmen’s
Bureau, the Civil Rights Act, and the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the Second
Amendment rights of the freedmen, see, e.g, McDonald v. Chicago at 771–78; id. at 846–50
(Thomas, J., concurring); STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT,
AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS, 1866-1876 (1998) (cited in Heller at 614–15, and in McDonald
at 771 n.18, 776, 780).
214 An Act to punish certain Offences therein named, and for other purposes, ch. 23, §1,
1865 Miss. Laws 165, 165-66 (Nov. 29, 1865) (regular session).
215 Decision of Chief Justice Handy, Declaring the Civil Rights Bill Unconstitutional, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 26, 1866, at 2, col. 3.
216 Even by Mississippi standards, Alexander H. Handy (1809–71) was an ardent and
adamant secessionist. See JOHN RAY SKATES, A HISTORY OF THE MISSISSIPPI SUPREME
COURT:1817-1948 (1972).
217 “Every citizen has a right to bear arms in defence of himself and the State.” MISS.
209
210
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Handy said that section one of the Thirteenth Amendment, 218 which had
liberated Lewis from slavery, did not change the practice which had existed in
many non-slave states that “the African race, even when free, are essentially
a degraded caste, of inferior rank and condition in society.” 219
Section two of the Thirteenth Amendment gave Congress “the power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” 220 According to the Chief
Justice, this gave Congress the power to act against the holding of people in
slavery, but not to pass legislation regarding how ex-slaves were treated by the
states. The Civil Rights Act had mandated that blacks must have “full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property
as are enjoyed by white citizens.” 221 This would make Mississippi’s gun
licensing law illegal. But the Civil Rights Act was unconstitutional, because
Congress had no power to enact it, the Mississippi Court ruled. 222
The 1866 case was not the only time the Mississippi Court would take a
hard line on gun control. In a later case, a Sheriff gave his pistol to a gunsmith,
Strahan, for repair. After the repair was completed, Strahan put the pistol in
his pocket, and delivered it to the Sheriff. The Mississippi Supreme Court
upheld the conviction for violation of the concealed carry ban. 223
In 1883, in the Civil Rights Cases, the U.S. Supreme Court would rule that
Section two of the Thirteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to abolish “all
badges and incidents of slavery.” 224 Since disarmament was an “incident” of
slavery, 225 this would allow Congress to act against disarmament laws. But by
1883, Congress had lost any appetite for interfering with white supremacy in
the ex-Confederacy.

CONST. art. I, § 23 (1817). The current version of the right is “The right of every citizen to keep
and bear arms in defense of his home, person, or property, or in aid of the civil power when
thereto legally summoned, shall not be called in question, but the Legislature may regulate or
forbid carrying concealed weapons.” MISS. CONST. art. III, § 12.
218 “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
219 Quoting JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 258n (1826).
220 “Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” U.S.
CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
221 Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 2; CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 129
(1866)
222 Decision by Chief Justice Handy, supra.
223 Strahan v. State, 68 Miss. 347, 8 So. 344 (1891)
224 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 4 (1883).
225 McDonald at 843–46 (Thomas, J., concurring); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T.
Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J.
309, 335-38 (1991); Kopel, Background Checks at ____ (compiling statutes from colonial era
through 1860).
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B. United States v. Cruikshank

After the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, Congress re-enacted
the Civil Rights Act. Congress also passed the Enforcement Act, providing
criminal penalties for persons who attempted to deprive persons of their civil
rights. 226 As a result, there were federal criminal prosecutions of persons who
had deprived freedmen of their Second Amendment rights. 227
But that came to an end in the 1876 Supreme Court case United States v.
Cruikshank. 228 William Cruikshank was among the leaders of a group of
whites who attacked and slaughtered scores of blacks at the county courthouse
in Colfax, Louisiana. 229 The massacre resulted from a dispute about whether
the white supremacist Democrats allied with Cruikshank, or the black and
white Republicans who barricaded themselves in the courthouse would control
the county government. The white Republicans were allowed to flee before the
massacre began. The barricaded blacks were armed, but mostly with lowquality short-range shotguns. Cruikshank and his followers attacked with
high-quality, longer-range rifles. 230
When the criminal prosecution of Cruikshank and others for violations of
the constitutional rights of the victims reached the Supreme Court, the Court
stated that right recognized in the Second Amendment, as well as the First
Amendment right of peaceable assembly, had pre-existed the Constitution. 231
Ergo, First and Second Amendment rights had not been created by the
Constitution; they were simply protected by the Constitution against federal
infringement. The Privileges or Immunities protected by section one of the
Fourteenth Amendment were only those which had been actually created by
the formation of a national government under the Constitution. (E.g., the right
to U.S. consular protection when traveling in a foreign nation, the right to
travel to Washington, D.C., to do business with the federal government.)
“An act to enforce the rights of citizens of the United States to vote in the several states
of this Union, and for other purposes,” 16 Stat. 140 (May 31, 1870).
227 See McDonald at 837 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Proceedings in the Ku Klux Trials
at Columbia, S. C., in the United States Circuit Court, November Term, 1871, p. 147 (1872));
Kermit L. Hall, Political Power and Constitutional Legitimacy: The South Carolina Ku Klux
Klan Trials, 1871-1872, 33 EMORY L.J. 921 (1984).
228 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
229 CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED (2008). Cited in McDonald at 757 n.6.
230 LANE, at ____. Among the stellar defense team for Cruikshank were former U.S.
Supreme Court Justice John Campbell, and U.S. Senator Reverdy Johnson (D-Md.), an ardent
opponent of Reconstruction and the 14th Amendment. Id. at ___.
231 Id at 551–53.
Some but not all of the defendants had been convicted at trial. They moved in arrest of
judgment. The two-judge panel on the Circuit Court split, and certified the case to the Supreme
Court. Justice Bradley was circuit-riding, and he voted to arrest the judgment. In a tie vote,
the Supreme Court Justice won, so in the Supreme Court case, the United States was the
moving party. United States v Cruikshank, 1 Woods 308, no 14,897, 13 Am. Law Reg. (N.S.)
630 (Cir. Ct., D. La. 1874). Woods would be appointed to the Supreme Court in 1881, and serve
until 1887.
226
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Hence, Congress’s enforcement power under section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment could not be used to protect First and Second Amendment rights.
Justice Thomas explained the consequences:
Cruikshank’s holding that blacks could look only to state
governments for protection of their right to keep and bear arms
enabled private forces, often with the assistance of local
governments, to subjugate the newly freed slaves and their
descendants through a wave of private violence designed to drive
blacks from the voting booth and force them into peonage, an
effective return to slavery. Without federal enforcement of the
inalienable right to keep and bear arms, these militias and mobs
were tragically successful in waging a campaign of terror against
the very people the Fourteenth Amendment had just made
citizens. 232
Although Cruikshank is not as famous as the Slaughter-House Cases or the
Civil Rights Cases, James Gray Pope argues that it is really the case which
accomplished what the other cases are given credit (or blame) for. The idea
that the Privilege or Immunities Clause does not protect the Bill of Rights was
dicta in Slaughter-House, but was applied to the Bill of Rights in Cruikshank.
The idea that the Fourteenth Amendment only applies to state action is
attributed to the Civil Rights Cases, but it was announced years before in
Cruikshank, as part of the holding. 233 In terms of how Slaughter-House and
Cruikshank have been understand by the last several generations of lawyers,
Pope is correct.
However, Gerald Magliocca argues that in the nineteenth century, neither
the Supreme Court nor the bar understood Slaughter-House and Cruikshank
as rejecting Privileges or Immunities incorporation of any and every item from
the Bill of Rights. Rather, the broadly restrictive interpretation was created by
the Supreme Court around 1900, in retrospective declarations about what
Slaughter-House and Cruikshank had really meant. 234 This helps explain why,
notwithstanding Slaughter-House and Cruikshank, one of the greatest
Supreme Court litigators of the century, Lyman Trumbull, would bring a
Second Amendment case to the Supreme Court in 1886, as will be detailed
infra.

McDonald at 855–56.
See James Gray Pope, Snubbed Landmark: Why United States v. Cruikshank (1876)
Belongs at the Heart of the American Constitutional Canon, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385
(2014).
234 Gerald Magliocca, Why Did the Incorporation of the Bill of Rights Fail in the Late
Nineteenth Century? 94 MINN. L. REV. 102 (2009).
232
233
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C. Tennessee

Tennessee, a border state, had acted speedily upon the April 1865 surrender
of the Confederate States of America, and its representatives were soon back
in the United States Congress. As a result, Tennessee escaped the military rule
which was imposed on the other ex-confederate states. A new constitutional
convention was held, and it declared all acts of the confederate state legislature
null and void ab initio. 235
This led to Smith v. Ishenhour (Tenn. 1866). 236 In 1861, Tennessee’s
Confederate government had enacted a statute authorizing the seizure of
citizen arms for use by the Confederate army. 237 Acting under authority
delegated by the state’s Confederate Governor, Smith had seized Ishenhour’s
firearm in 1862. 238
After the war, Ishenhour sued Smith for trespass, for taking his gun. He
won the case before a Justice of the Peace. The Tennessee Supreme Court had
no trouble disposing of Smith’s appeal. 239 Smith was personally liable, for
although he had purported statutory authority, the statute was void. Besides
that, the confiscation statute “utterly disregarded” the state constitution, and
was “the first attempt, in the history of the Anglo-Saxon race, of which we are
apprised, to disarm the people by legislation.” 240
But soon, the Tennessee legislature would resume its traditional role as the
leading arms control legislature in the nation. Like other Southern state
legislatures after 1868, Tennessee steered away from gun control laws which
explicitly discriminated based on race. Provoking Congress would not be a good
idea, and expressly racial gun control might run afoul of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. So arms control laws were always
racially neutral on paper, although in practice this was not always so. A Florida
Supreme Court Justice, describing a gun control law enacted during Jim Crow,
wrote that “The statute was never intended to be applied to the white
population and in practice has never been so applied.” 241
Smith v. Ishenhour, 43 Tenn. (3 Cold.) 214, 217–18 (1866).
Smith v. Ishenhour, 43 Tenn. (3 Cold.) 214 (1866).
237 Id. at 216–17.
238 Id. at 215.
239 Id. at 215.
240 Id. at 217. The Court also could have cited the England’s 1671 Game Act, which was
applied by Kings Charles II and James II with the purpose of disarming the population, thus
preventing forcible resistance to their arbitrary rule, but eventually helping to cause the
downfall of the Stuart line in the Glorious Revolution. MALCOLM; Heller at 612–13 (quoting
Nunn at 251); text at note --- supra.
235
236

241

I know something of the history of this legislation. The original Act of 1893 was
passed when there was a great influx of negro laborers in this State drawn
here for the purpose of working in turpentine and lumber camps. The same
condition existed when the Act was amended in 1901 and the Act was passed
for the purpose of disarming the negro laborers and to thereby reduce the
unlawful homicides that were prevalent in turpentine and saw-mill camps and
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Andrews v. State (Tenn. 1871). 242 In 1870, the Tennessee Legislature
prohibited the carrying of “a dirk, 243 sword-cane, Spanish stiletto, 244 belt or
pocket pistol or revolver,” either openly or concealed. 245 The language about
“belt or pocket pistol or revolver” covered many but not all handguns.
The case known as Andrews v. State was a consolidated appeal of cases
involving four defendants: Andrews, O’Toole, Custer, and Page. Andrews was
convicted and appealed. O’Toole had been successful in quashing his
indictment on the grounds that the statute was unconstitutional, so the
prosecutor appealed. Custer was convicted, but the trial court refused to order
him to post bond for good behavior (“surety for the peace”) and so the
prosecutor appealed. Page was on one occasion “seen coming from his home
along the big road, about a mile distant from his house, carrying in his hand,
swinging by his side, a pistol called a revolver, about eight inches long,” and
had threatened to perpetrate an assault, and was convicted. 246
All of the defendants had moved that their indictments be quashed on the
grounds that the indictments had not specified what type of pistol was carried.
None of these motions had prevailed. Andrews had wanted to introduce
evidence “that there was a set of men in the neighborhood of defendant during
the time he had carried his pistol, and before, seeking the life of defendant.” 247

to give the white citizens in sparsely settled areas a better feeling of security.
The statute was never intended to be applied to the white population and in
practice has never been so applied. We have no statistics available, but it is a
safe guess that more than 80% of the white men living rural sections of Florida
have violated this statute. It is also a safe guess to say that not more than 5%
of the men in Florida who own pistols and repeating rifles have ever applied to
the Board of County Commissioners for a permit to have the same in their
possession and there has never been, within my knowledge, any effort to
enforce the provisions of this statute as to white people, because it has been
generally conceded to be in contravention of the Constitution and nonenforceable if contested.
Watson v. Stone, 4 So.2d 700, 703 (Fla. 1941) (Buford, J., concurring) (the case held that a
handgun in an automobile glove compartment did not violate the statutory restriction on
“carrying”).
242 Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165 (1871).
243 A knife with one cutting edge, originally created in Scotland; prohibited by Great
Britain’s “Disarming Acts” of 1716 and 1725, in response to Scottish uprisings. HAROLD L.
PETERSON, DAGGERS & FIGHTING KNIVES OF THE WESTERN WORLD 60 (1968); American Knife
& Tool Institute, ATKI Approved Knife Definitions, http://www.akti.org/resources/aktiapproved-knife-definitions/#dirk
244 This apparently refers to thin-bladed Spanish knives which open automatically when a
lever or button releases a spring. http://www.autoknife.info/Spanish_1.html. The American
Tool and Knife Institute argues that the terms “dirk” and “stiletto” are unconstitutionally
vague. ATKI Approved Knife Definitions, supra.
245 Andrews at 171.
246 Id. at 201.
247 Id. at 188.
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This evidence had been properly refused, said the state Supreme Court, given
the proof “that he had been in the habit of carrying a pistol since the war.” 248
The Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that all the first three indictments
must be quashed, whereas Page’s conviction was affirmed.
The ban on open public carry could not be applied to militia-suitable arms:
“the rifle, of all descriptions, the shot gun, the musket and repeater.” 249 The
“repeater” was a “pistol” that “is a soldier’s weapon—skill in the use of which
will add to the efficiency of the soldier. If such is the character of the weapon
here designated, then the prohibition of the statute is too broad to be allowed
to stand…” 250 Further, the carry ban had the effect of prohibiting the carrying
of a gun to places for target practice or for repair, both of which were
constitutionally protected:
The right to keep arms, necessarily involves the right to purchase
them, to keep them in a state of efficiency for use, and to purchase
and provide ammunition suitable for such arms, and to keep them
in repair…. But farther than this, it must be held, that the right
to keep arms involves, necessarily, the right to use such arms for
all the ordinary purposes, and in all the ordinary modes usual in
the country, and to which arms are adapted, limited by the duties
of a good citizen in times of peace; that in such use, he shall not
use them for violation of the rights of others, or the paramount
rights of the community of which he makes a part. 251
In the twenty-first century, Andrews is one of the few post-war cases to
stand as an important authority. Heller quoted the above language about “all
the ordinary purposes” and “all the ordinary modes usual in the country,”
subject to “the duties of a good citizen in times of peace.” 252 Heller also cited
Andrews for the principle that the Second Amendment is not only for
militiamen. 253 Finally, Heller pointed to the carry restriction in Andrews as
one of the “[f]ew laws in our history” that approached the severity of the D.C.
handgun ban, and noted with approval that the handgun carry ban in Andrews
had been “struck down.” 254
Id. at 188.
Id. at 171.
250 Id. at 171.
251 Id. at 178-79.
252 Heller at 614.
253 Heller at 609.
254 Heller at 629. Justice Stevens also quoted language from Andrews stating that some
arms (those that are not of the type for militia service) can be banned. McDonald v. Chicago
at 937 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens said that Andrews “summarized the
Reconstruction understanding of the states’ police power to regulate firearms.” Id. If that is
true, the understanding is contrary to Justice Stevens’ view that Chicago can constitutionally
ban all handguns, even in the home.
248
249
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Post-Heller, Andrews has been cited by the Sixth Circuit in upholding a
sentence enhancement of using a gun in a crime, 255 by the Ninth Circuit in
striking down a near-total prohibition on defensive handgun carrying, 256 and
by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California in striking
down unreasonable delays on the purchase of firearms. 257 It has been miscited
by some courts as purported authority for statutes making in nearly impossible
for citizens to carry handguns for lawful protection. 258 The Second Circuit put
Andrews in a list of cases where severe restrictions on the right to carry
“withstood constitutional challenges.” 259 The passage does not create
confidence that the author read Andrews or Heller carefully.
State v. Wilburn (Tenn. 1872). 260 The Tennessee legislature responded
promptly to Andrews. A new statute banned carrying any handgun “other than
an army pistol, or such as are commonly carried and used in the United States
army.” 261 This was the narrowest reading possible of the Aymette-Andrews
“civilized warfare” rule that only militia-suitable arms were constitutionally
protected. The obvious effect was that the military handguns owned by exconfederate officers and ex-cavalrymen (likely to be wealthier, since
cavalrymen typically had to supply their own horse) were protected, whereas
the smaller, less expensive handguns which might be owned by freedmen were
not.
However, the statute also did its best to constrain all carry: “in no case shall
it be lawful for any person to carry such army pistol publicly or privately about
his person in any other manner than openly in his hands...” 262
To say the least, requiring that gun carriers must carry in the hand is
extremely dangerous. Especially in a period when many handguns did not have
safeties or trigger guards, the potential to cause accidents was enormous. The
inconvenience of this mode of carry was obviously designed to discourage
carrying.
There is a pattern in some post-bellum Southern Supreme Courts of
attempting to enforce constitutional rights, and then giving up under incessant
pressure of the legislature. One good example is the Alabama Supreme Court,
which three times relied on the federal Civil Rights Act (protecting the right to
contract) to strike down state statutes against inter-racial marriage. But after
United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 520 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting the concurring
opinion that (“Neither the old [1796] nor the new [1870 state] Constitution confers the right to
keep, or to bear, or to wear arms, for the purpose of aggression.”) (brackets added).
256 Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1157 (9th Cir. 2014), reh’g en banc
granted, 781 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2015). Because en banc review was granted, the Peruta
decision has been vacated. Id. Peruta and Greeno both examine many of the nineteenth century
cases carefully.
257 Silvester v. Harris, 41 F.Supp.3d 927, 962 (E.D. Calif. 2014).
258 See In re Wheeler, 81 A.3d 728, 758 (N.J. Super. A.D. 2013).
259 Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 90–91 (2d Cir. 2012).
260 State v. Wilburn, 66 Tenn. (7 Baxt.) 57 (1872).
261 Id. at 61.
262 Id. at 61.
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the Indiana Supreme Court upheld an Indiana law on the same subject (on the
theory that marriage is “status,” not “contract”), the Alabama Supreme Court
gave up, and its fourth case finally allowed Alabama’s statute against interracial marriage to stand. 263
The Tennessee Supreme Court was less resilient, giving up after only one
time. The Wilburn decision unanimously upheld the abrogation for almost all
practical purposes of the right to carry a handgun. 264
It had only taken a few decades for Tennessee to go all the way down the
slippery slope. The 1837 statute merely forbade carrying a concealed bowie
knife, but by 1872 it was illegal to carry any handgun, except that a person
could carry an expensive and large handgun in a manner that no prudent
person would want to. The results would not have surprised the Kentucky
Supreme Court which had decided Bliss v. Commonwealth in 1822; an allowed
infringement of part of the right may eventually lead to the destruction of the
right.
A few years later, in State v. Callicutt, the Tennessee Court upheld an 1856
statute making it illegal to sell or loan pistols or other dangerous weapons to
minors. 265 The statute had an exception for hunting and for self-defense when
traveling. 266 The Court opined that there was no right to carry arms for selfdefense; rather, defensive carry was “justly branded as a crime that ought to
be suppressed.” 267 That aspect of the Callicutt opinion is not followed today,
but courts have cited Callicutt as an example of “longstanding” restrictions on
minors acquiring arms. 268
State v. Burgoyne (Tenn. 1881). 269 Having previously disposed of handgun
carry, the Tennessee legislature in 1879 outlawed the sale of all handguns
“except army or navy pistols.” 270
Burgoyne was the first firearms businessmen to be a party in a right to
arms case. He was a licensed merchant in Memphis. Burgoyne had an active
merchant’s license when the sales ban went into effect on March 17, 1879. He
continued to sell pistols, some of them not “army or navy,” afterwards. Later,
his merchant’s license expired, and he acquired a second license. He continued
to sell the inventory of arms which he had acquired before March 17. 271

PEGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES NATURALLY: MISCEGENATION LAW AND THE MAKING OF
RACE IN AMERICA (2010).
264 Wilburn at 62–63.
265 State v. Callicutt, 69 Tenn. 714 (1878).
266 1855–56 Tenn. Acts 92 (Feb. 26, 1856).
267 Callicutt at 716.
268 National Rifle Ass’n of America, Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 203 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8, 14–15 (1st
Cir. 2009).
269 State v. Burgoyne, 75 Tenn. (7 Lea) 173 (Tenn. 1881).
270 Id. at 173–74.
271 Id. at 174.
263
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The Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that the gun ban was constitutional,
since it would help reduce the carrying of concealed handguns, which had been
recognized as a constitutional purpose. 272
However, there was a separate constitutional problem: the unreasonable
interference with Burgoyne’s sale of goods which he had lawfully acquired. The
court ruled that the exception provided by the legislature was sufficient:
merchants with handguns could continue to sell handgun inventory acquired
before the ban, until their current license expired. So Burgoyne’s handgun
sales under the first license were legal, but his sales under the second license
were illegal. His fine was affirmed. 273
As Burgoyne demonstrates, not everything which is historic is
constitutional. 274 This is particularly so for Jim Crow precedents restricting
enumerated rights.

D. Arkansas

Fife v. State (1876). 275 Tennessee’s greatest competitor as gun control
exemplar was Arkansas. There too, the state supreme court eventually acceded
to the state legislature’s efforts to extirpate lawful handgun carry.
The 1874 election was the first in which former Arkansas Confederates
were allowed to vote. They elected huge Democratic majorities, and ended
Reconstruction in the state. 276 In February 1875, the new state legislature
enacted a statute against carrying concealed arms. 277 On September 17, 1875,
a witness saw Alfred Fife on a street in Pine Bluff, “in company with one Terry,
near Trulock’s bank.” 278 Fife “had a banjo under his left arm, and a pistol in
his hand.” 279
The witness spoke to Fife’s companion, Terry. 280 Whereupon Fife “raised
his pistol” and asked Terry what the witness had said to Terry. 281 The

Id. at 175–76.
Id. at 176–79.
274 Burgoyne was cited by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1917 for the proposition that “the
sale of deadly weapons may be absolutely prohibited,” and that prohibition in no way conflicts
with the constitutional right to arms. Biffer v. City of Chicago, 278 Ill. 562, 569, 116 N.E. 182,
185 (1917).
275 Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455 (1876).
276 Civil War through Reconstruction, 1861 through 1874, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARKANSAS
HISTORY & CULTURE (Butler Center for Arkansas Studies, Central Arkansas Library System),
http://www.encyclopediaofarkansas.net/encyclopedia/entry-detail.aspx?entryID=388.
277 Act of 16th Feb., 1875
278 Fife, 31 Ark. at 455.
279 Id. at 455–56.
280 Id. at 456.
281 Id.
272
273
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[w]itness replied that he was talking to Terry. [Fife] 282 laid the
guard of his pistol, which he held in his hand, against the face of
witness, and said that, meaning the pistol, ruled the world, to
which witness replied: ‘Yes, it did.’ Witness saw the pistol, and
thought it was a revolver.
On the same day, perhaps, another witness saw plaintiff in a
drug store, with a pistol in his hand. He did not notice it
particularly, but thought it was a revolver.
On the evening of the same day, [Fife] was playing cards in a
saloon, when an intoxicated man came in, and [Fife] undertook to
put him out. They clenched and fell behind a screen. After the
difficulty was over, the saloon keeper found on the floor the
cylinder of a pistol, but he saw [Fife] with no pistol. 283
The Supreme Court reasonably concluded “It is probable, from all the
evidence, that [Fife] was carrying a pocket revolver.” 284 The state statute
banned “carrying, as a weapon, ‘any pistol of any kind whatever,’ with
provisions for exceptional cases.” 285
Fife was convicted by a jury, and the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected his
argument that the concealed carry statute was unconstitutional. The Arkansas
court hewed closely to and quoted extensively from Tennessee’s Andrews v.
State. 286 Reading the Arkansas statute narrowly, the Court found that it
applied to “the pistol intended to be proscribed is such as is usually carried in
the pocket, or of a size to be concealed about the person, and used in private
quarrels and brawls, and not such as is in ordinary use, and effective as a
weapon of war, and useful and necessary for ‘the common defense.’” 287
After quoting Andrews’ listing of constitutionally protected arms, Fife
explained that the “repeater” pistol meant “the army and navy repeaters,
which, in recent warfare, have very generally superseded the old-fashioned
holster, used as a weapon in the battles of our forefathers.” 288 The “pocket
revolver” that Fife had been carrying was not a military handgun, so Fife’s
conviction was upheld.

In the block quote here, the court refers to Fife as “Plaintiff.” Fife was, in the
terminology of the day, the “plaintiff-in-error,” because he was bringing a case in which he
alleged a lower court had made an error. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1035 (5th ed. 1979).
283 Fife, 31 Ark. at 456.
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Id. at 461.
288 Id. at 460–61. The Fife court suggested that Andrews’ examples of some of the arms
which are constitutionally protected should have included “the sword, though not such as are
concealed in a cane.” Id.
282
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As was typical in states with carry restrictions, Arkansas had exceptions
for persons on their own premises or on a journey. 289
Wilson v. State (Ark. 1878) 290 straightforwardly followed Fife and Andrews.
The trial court had excluded evidence that Chancy Wilson borrowed “a large
army size six shooter, a revolving pistol, 44 caliber, eight inches in the barrel,
such as is commonly used in warfare.” 291 He said that
he was going over to Pearman’s to shoot wild hogs. On the next
day he went to Pearman’s, stated to him the purpose of his visit,
and while conversing with him, before going into dinner, pulled
the pistol out of his boot, cocked it a few times to see if it would
revolve, and then put it around under his coat, and went in to
dinner. 292
The Supreme Court held that individuals had a right to openly carry armyquality handguns in public. Wilson had the right to a jury instruction, which
had been refused at trial, “that if they believed from the evidence, that the
pistol carried by him was an army size pistol, such as are commonly used in
warfare, they should acquit.” 293 “[T]o prohibit the citizen from wearing or
carrying a war arm….is an unwarranted restriction upon his constitutional

State v. Wardlaw, 43 Ark. 73, 74 (1884). Wardlaw found a derringer to be within the
scope of the carry ban. Id. at 74. The statute should not be implied to require that the gun
must be loaded, for this is “a fact which can hardly ever be ascertained beyond peradventure.”
Id. at 74–75. This was true for old-fashioned muzzle-loading guns which were still common in
1884. It is not true for modern breech-loading firearms; for them, it is easy to open the gun and
examine the firing chamber.
For more on the journey exception, see John Thomas Shepherd, Comment, Who is the
Arkansas Traveler?: Analyzing Arkansas’s “Journey” Exception to the Offense of Carrying a
Weapon, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 463 (2013) (also examining similar exemptions in Mississippi,
Missouri, and Texas). The Arkansas nineteenth century courts applied the “journey” exception
liberally, whenever a person traveled beyond his “circle of neighbors.” Shepherd, at 468–71.
Texas did not adopt the “circle of neighbors” test, and its jurisprudence on the meaning of “a
person who is traveling” has long been confusing. See Jack Skaggs, Comment, Have Gun, Will
Travel? The Hopelessly Confusing Journey of the Traveling Exception to the Unlawful Carrying
Weapons Statute, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 507 (2005). The Texas problem was mostly solved in 2007
by legislation specifying that a carry permit is not necessary for carrying a handgun in an
automobile. TEX. PENAL CODE §46.02; Motorist Protection Act, HB1815 (2007).
290 Wilson v. State, 33 Ark. 557 (1878). Along with Andrews and Fife, Wilson was cited by
the dissent in Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 451 (3d Cir. 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting)
(arguing that New Jersey’s refusal to issue carry permits except in rare circumstances violates
the Second Amendment).
291 Wilson, 33 Ark. at 559.
292 Id.
293 Id.
289
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right to keep and bear arms.” 294 The conviction was reversed and the case
remanded for a new trial. 295
Holland v. State (Ark. 1878). 296 Also in 1878, the Arkansas Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the conviction of James Holland. On October 1, 1875,
a witness saw Holland riding a horse, with two guns in the saddlebags—a navy
size Remington, and “a Colt’s army pistol.” 297 Holland said he was from
Texas. 298 The trial court erred by refusing to give Holland’s requested
instruction “that if they found from the evidence that the pistols, proven to
have been carried, were army sized pistols, and were such as are commonly
used in the United States military and naval service, they must acquit
defendant.” 299 So the case was remanded for a new trial. 300
In Fife, Wilson, and Holland, the Arkansas Supreme Court had protected
the right to carry, at least for large handguns openly carried. But the judicial
will to resist would soon wane.
Haile v. State (Ark. 1882). 301 In 1881 the Arkansas legislature copied the
1872 Tennessee statute which outlawed “the carrying of army pistols except
uncovered and in the hand.” 302 In the trial court, the parties agreed on all the
facts: On Sept. 26, 1881, Haile had carried openly “and buckled around his
waist…a large revolving pistol, known as the Colts army pistol.” 303 He was not
within the scope of any of the statutory exemptions, since he was not an army
officer or carrying under the direction thereof; “he was not upon a journey, nor
upon his own premises.” 304
He appealed after being fined 50 dollars. 305 Yet he did not submit a brief on
appeal. 306 The court reached out to address the constitutional issue, for “we
suppose his exceptions refer to the validity of the act as unconstitutional.”307
Citing Tennessee’s Wilburn decision upholding a similar statute, the Arkansas
court affirmed Haile’s conviction, while insisting “The constitutional right is a
very valuable one. We would not disparage it.” 308

Id. at 560. “If cowardly and dishonorable men sometimes shoot unarmed men with army
pistols or guns, the evil must be prevented by the penitentiary and gallows, and not by a
general deprivation of a constitutional privilege.” Id.
295 Id.
296 Holland v. State, 33 Ark. 560 (1878).
297 Id. at 561.
298 Id.
299 Id.
300 Id.
301 Haile v. State, 38 Ark. 564 (1882).
302 Act of April 1, 1881.
303 Haile at 564.
304 Id. at 564.
305 Id. at 564.
306 Id. at 565.
307 Id. at 564.
308 Haile at 566-67.
294

46

Dabbs v. State (Ark. 1885). 309 Arkansas in 1881 also enacted a copy of the
1879 Tennessee ban on the sale of all handguns, except those “used in the army
or navy of the United States and known as the navy pistol.” 310 Dabbs pleaded
guilty to selling a pocket pistol, and the court assessed a fine. Dabbs then
“moved in arrest of judgment.” 311
On appeal, the Attorney General took a hard line: “The right to ‘keep and
bear arms’ may be absolutely prohibited.” 312 The Arkansas Supreme Court did
not go that far, but it did uphold Dabbs’s conviction and the statute, since it
did not ban arms which are “useful in warfare.” 313 Neither Haile nor Dabbs
have been cited by any post-Heller court.

E. Texas

English v. State (Tex. 1872). 314 An 1871 statute forbade the open or
concealed carrying of handguns and a variety of edged weapons under most
circumstances. 315 The Texas Supreme Court analyzed the law in the context of
three combined appeals.
English was intoxicated when a witness saw him with a pistol. The pistol
was unloaded and inoperable. He was taking “it along with him to have it
mended.” 316 Daniels had gone “into a religious assembly.” 317 There, witnesses
had seen “the handle of a butcher knife was sticking out above the waistband
of his breeches, and between the skirts of his frock coat.” 318 There was “[n]o
transcript in Carter’s case.” 319 Neither Daniels nor Carter filed a brief.
The court upheld the convictions of English, Daniels, and Carter. The court
said that the right to arms was only for weapons of war, and that laws against
concealed carry were constitutional. The court did not inquire as to whether
English’s pistol was or was not the type that was constitutionally protected.
The Court thought that Texans had bad habits with guns, and explained
the cause: Texas’s unusual and unfortunate legal and cultural heritage from
Dabbs v. State, 39 Ark. 353 (1882).
General Pistol Act of 1881.
311 Dabbs at 355.
312 Id.
309
310

313

The law was enacted as a measure of precaution for the prevention of crimes
and calamities. It is leveled at the pernicious habit of wearing such dangerous
or deadly weapons as are easily concealed about the person. It does not abridge
the constitutional right of citizens to keep and bear arms for the common
defense; for it in no wise restrains the use or sale of such arms as are useful in
warfare.
Id. at 356–57.
314 English v. State, 35 Tex. 473 (1872).
315 Act to regulate the keeping and bearing of deadly weapons (Apr. 11, 1871).
316 English, at 473.
317 Id. at 473–74.
318 Id. at 474.
319 Id.
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Spain. 320 Spain, in turn, was said by the court to have a mixture of
Carthaginian, Visigoth, Arab, and other influences. 321 The court looked to the
new gun control statute as a salutary example of the Spanish influence being
displaced by “the sound philosophy and pure morality of the common law.” 322
The state’s founding traditions of liberty were rejected: “We will not say to
what extent the early customs and habits of the people of this state should be
respected and accommodated, where they may come in conflict with the ideas
of intelligent and well-meaning legislators.” 323
As to what the right to arms protected, English said it was those “as are
used for purposes of war,” such as “musket and bayonet…the sabre, holster
pistols and carbine…the field piece, siege gun, and mortar, with side arms.” 324
These were contrasted with “dirks, daggers, slungshots, sword-canes, brassknuckles and bowie knives,” which were “employed in quarrels and broils, and
fights between maddened individuals.” 325 In support of the distinction, English
pointed out that “Blackstone says, the offense of riding or going around with
dangerous or unusual weapons is a crime against the public peace, by
terrifying the good people of the land.” 326
English is cited in Heller as an illustration of what Heller calls “the
historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual
weapons.’” 327 Heller also cited three other cases which had the “dangerous and
unusual” language, although these were terse, fact-bound cases which just
contained the quote about the common law crime, and did not analyze or
mention the right to arms. 328
Id. at 480.
Id.
322 English, at 480.
323 Id.
324 English at 475.
325 English at 475. A “slungshot” is not the same as a “slingshot.” The former is a cord with
a loop in the middle, and weighted balls at each end; it is a maritime tool, used for casting
lines. See GEORGE CAMERON STONE, A GLOSSARY OF THE CONSTRUCTION, DECORATION AND USE
OF ARMS AND ARMOR 568 (Dover Mil. Hist. 1999) (1934).
326 Id.
327 Heller at 627.
English is also cited by Justice Stevens’ dissent in McDonald, as “observing that ‘almost,
if not every one of the States of this Union have [a prohibition on the carrying of deadly
weapons] upon their statute books,” and lambasting claims of a right to carry such weapons as
“little short of ridiculous.” McDonald at 888 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing English at 478–
79). This overlooks the fact that except in some ex-Confederate states, the carry laws were
non-prohibitive, applying only to carrying in a concealed or terrifying manner.
328 Heller at 627, citing State v. Langford, 10 N.C. 381, 383–84 (1824); O’Neill v. State, 16
Ala. 65, 67 (1849); English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 476 (1871); State v. Lanier, 71 N.C. 288, 289
(1874).
In Langford, there had clearly been a breach of the peace because “These men were armed
with guns, which they fired at the house of an unprotected female, thus exciting her alarm for
the safety of her person and her property.” 10 N.C. at 383. However, the court also discussed
the general meaning of “affray”: “it seems certain there may be an affray when there is no
actual violence: as when a man arms himself with dangerous and unusual weapons, in such a
320
321
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While Heller adopted English’s “dangerous and unusual” general rule,
Heller did not adopt English’s warfare-based test of which arms were protected
or excluded by the rule. Heller makes no distinction between concealable
pistols (unprotected under English) versus larger “holster pistols” (protected
under English).
State v. Duke (Tex. 1875). 329 George Duke was indicted under the charge
that on Dec. 23, 1871 he did “unlawfully carry on his person one pistol, known
as a six-shooter.” 330
The court said that citizens had a right to own “such arms as are commonly
kept, according to the customs of the people, and are appropriate for open and
manly use in self-defense, as well as such as are proper for the defense of the
State.” 331 This included “the double-barreled shot-gun, the huntsman’s rifle,
and such pistols at least as are not adapted to being carried concealed,” and
“beyond question, the dragoon or holster pistol.” 332
As for carrying in public, Duke found that near-prohibition was “a
legitimate and highly proper regulation of their use.” 333 The carry law merely
served to “regulate the place where, and the circumstances under which, a
pistol may be carried.” 334 The statute had exceptions for “certain officers in
actual service, and any one having reasonable grounds to fear an attack.” 335
The district court had ruled that indictment was defective because it failed
to allege that English was not protected by either of the statutory exemptions
(military service or reasonable grounds to fear an attack). The State had
appealed, and English had filed no brief on appeal. Even so, the Supreme Court
affirmed the district court’s ruling against the form of the indictment. The
Supreme Court emphasized that based on the particular form of the “loosely
drawn statute,” a lawful indictment must negate the exceptions. 336
manner as will naturally cause a terror to the people.” Id.
O’Neill held that “mere words” of “vulgar or low abuse” did not constitute an affray. 16 Ala.
at 67. The court contrasted this with the rule that “if persons arm themselves with deadly or
unusual weapons for the purpose of an affray, and in such manner as to strike terror to the
people, they may be guilty of this offence, without coming to actual blows.” Id.
Lanier relied on Huntley, supra text at notes ---, to state that “the offence of going armed
with dangerous or unusual weapons is a crime against the public peace by terrifying the good
people of the land.” Id. at 289. While unarmed and laughing, Lanier had cantered his horse
through the courthouse, well after the court had adjourned for the day. The Lanier court said
that whether this constituted the aforesaid crime, “within the spirit of this offence,” should be
left to the jury. Id.
329 State v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455 (1875).
330 Id. at 456.
331 Id. at 459.
332 Id. A “dragoon” is a cavalry revolver.
333 Id.
334 Id.
335 Id. at 460.
336 Id. at 459–62. Although the indictment must negative the exceptions, the prosecutor
was not required to prove the negatives at trial. Leatherwood v. State, 6 Tex. App. 244, 247
(1879). Cf. Woodward v. State, 5 Tex. App. 296 (1878) (indictment had not negated the traveler
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Jennings v. State, (Tex. 1878). 337 Jennings was convicted of concealed carry,
a misdemeanor. He did not appeal the conviction, but he did appeal the county
court’s order, pursuant to state statute, that his gun be forfeited. The
intermediate court of appeals agreed:
While [the legislature] has the power to regulate the wearing of
arms, it has not the power by legislation to take a citizen’s arms
away from him. One of his most sacred rights is that of having
arms for his own defence and that of the State. This right is one
of the surest safeguards of liberty and self-preservation. 338
The forfeiture was reversed. 339

F. Georgia

State v. Hill (Ga. 1874). 340 Miles Hill was indicted for violating a statute
against going to a court of justice while carrying weapons. The Georgia
Supreme Court grudgingly acknowledged that the Nunn precedent protected
the general right to carry handguns. However, there was another right which
was equally important:
the right to go into a court-house and peacefully and safely seek
its privileges, is just as sacred as the right to carry arms, and if
the temple of justice is turned into a barracks, and a visitor to it
is compelled to mingle in a crowd of men loaded down with pistols
and Bowie-knives, or bristling with guns and bayonets, his right
of free access to the courts is just as much restricted as is the right
to bear arms infringed by prohibiting the practice before courts of
justice. 341
In 2012, the Eleventh Circuit used similar reasoning in rejecting a lawsuit
claiming that plaintiffs had a right to carry firearms in churches, regardless of
whether a particular church wanted them to. 342 Churches’ right to control their
own property was just as fundamental and traditional as plaintiffs’ right to
bear arms. 343
exception, but this was harmless, because Woodward carried the gun in his hand, rather than
in baggage, as travelers would do).
Arkansas held that the exceptions need not be negated in the indictment. See Walker v.
State, 35 Ark. 386, 388 (1880).
337 Jennings v. State, 5 Tex. App. 298 (1878).
338 Id. at 300–01.
339 Id. at 301.
340 State v. Hill, 53 Ga. 472 (1874).
341 Id. at 477–78. The Hill court did not cite the Statute of Northampton, but that statute
was created in large part because of armed interference with the courts. See text at ---- supra.
342 GeorgiaCarry.Org v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2012).
343 Id. at 1264–65.
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The U.S. Supreme Court in Heller stated that among the “longstanding”
gun controls which were “presumptively lawful” were bans on carrying guns in
“sensitive places, such as schools and government buildings.” 344 Hill and the
statute it upheld are early examples of the sensitive places doctrine.

G. Pennsylvania

North of the Mason-Dixon Line, gun control was less popular, so there were
consequently few non-Southern cases interpreting whether a particular law
infringed the right to arms. 345 One exception was the 1874 Wright v.
Heller at 626–27.
A recent article exaggerates the scope of gun control in the nineteenth-century North.
See Eric M. Ruben & Saul Cornell, Firearm Regionalism and Public Carry: Placing Southern
Antebellum Case Law in Context, 125 YALE L.J. FORUM 121 (2015). For example, the authors
point to an 1836 Massachusetts statute that authors call a “broad regulation of public carry.”
The Massachusetts model was copied by several non-Southern states. Id.
Actually, the Massachusetts statute required that if a gun carrier gave someone
“reasonable cause to fear an injury, or breach of the peace” and the gun carrier himself did not
have “reasonable cause to fear an assault,” then the gun carrier could be required to post a
bond for good behavior. 1836 Mass. Acts 750 (“If any person shall go armed with a dirk, dagger,
sword, pistol, or other offensive and dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to fear an
assault or other injury, or violence to his person, or to his family or property, he may, on
complaint of any person having reasonable cause to fear an injury, or breach of the peace, be
required to find sureties for keeping the peace . . . .”). The Massachusetts statute imposed a
reasonable requirement on persons whose conduct has already given “reasonable cause” for
concern that they would misuse the gun. It is a not a restriction on peaceable behavior.
Ruben and Cornell analogize the Massachusetts law to the Texas anti-carry law, discussed
infra. Ruben & Cornell at 133. But they overlook the difference between permissive regulation
and prohibition. Both statutes used similar language, in that they applied to a person who
carried in public and who did not have reasonable cause to fear an assault. In Texas, that was
the end of the matter; the person who carried would be criminally punished. In Massachusetts,
nothing would happen; the carrying could take place in the plain view of a law enforcement
officer, and no arrest could be made.
Instead, Massachusetts provided a system to rein in gun carriers whose individual
behavior made them appear threatening. If a private citizen could prove in court that the
behavior of the gun carrier created “reasonable cause to fear an injury, or breach of the peace,”
then the gun carrier could be required to post a bond for that he would cause unlawful injury
or breach of the peace. Having posted the bond, he could go on carrying. The Massachusetts
system demonstrated one way to leave the citizenry at liberty to carry, while imposing a
reasonable regulation on individuals whose behavior was proven to be worrisome. As
Chancellor Kent explained, “the personal security of every citizen is protected from lawless
violence” not only by the penal code, but also by “the preventive arm of the magistrate, as a
further protection from threatened or impending danger; and on reasonable cause being
shown, he may require his adversary to be bound to keep the peace.” JAMES KENT, 1
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *15–16 (8th ed., N.Y., William Kent 1854).
Ruben and Cornell follow Patrick Charles in asserting that the Statute of Northampton,
by its own force, prohibited peaceable carry in early America. As explained above, this
interpretation is implausible for the Statute of Northampton itself (especially following Sir
John Knight’s Case), and lacks any support in American statutes or case law related to the
Statute of Northampton. See text at notes ------ infra. Ruben and Cornell cite various early
American sources for prohibitions on going armed offensively, although these citations do
nothing to support the notion that peaceable carry was illegal. Ruben & Cornell at 129–30.
344
345
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Commonwealth. 346 Pennsylvania had not banned the peaceful carry of
concealed arms but had made it a crime to carry concealed with intent
“unlawfully and maliciously, to do bodily harm to some other person.” 347
Jonathan Wright was tried for this offense, and the jury acquitted him. But
the jury ruled he still had to pay the costs of the case. He appealed the costs,
and also argued that the statute was unconstitutional.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the constitutionality argument:
carrying a gun with intent to unlawfully and maliciously injure someone was
obviously not part of the right to arms. 348 As for the costs, “[w]e must presume
the jury had a good reason for doing so, arising in the conduct of the
defendant.” 349

Indeed, the notion that early Americans would have considered the sight of someone
peaceably carrying a firearm to be inherent terrifying is contradicted by the many early
American statutes which required firearms carrying in many non-militia situations, such as
while going to or from church, or traveling more than a short distance from one’s home. See,
e.g., WILLIAM WALLER HENING, 1 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE
LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 198
(1823) (1632 statute that ‘All men that are fittinge to beare arms, shall bring their pieces to
the church.’’); id. at 127, 198 (while working the ground; or whenever one shall “go or send
abroad”; enacted 1632); 1 PUBLIC RECORDS OF CONNECTICUT 95–96 (enacted 1643) (going to or
from church); NATHANIEL B. SHURTLEFF, 1 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND 85 (1853) (when traveling more than one mile from
dwelling houses); 1 RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS,
IN NEW ENGLAND 94 (John Russell Bartlett ed., 1856) (traveling more than two miles from
town, or attending any public meeting); 3 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND 103 (J. Hall Pleasants ed.,
1935) (enacted 1642) (church meetings, travel); DAVID J. MCCORD, 7 STATUTES AT LARGE OF
SOUTH CAROLINA 417–19 (1840) (churches or other public religious meetings); 19 (part 1) THE
COLONIAL RECORDS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 137–40 (Allen D. Candler ed., 1904) (enacted
1770) (same as South Carolina).
Thus, it is not surprising that criminal justice offer manuals from early America contain
no instruction to arrest people for peaceably carrying arms. See ISAAC GOODWIN, NEW
ENGLAND SHERIFF (Worcester, Dorr & Howland 1830); CHARLES W. HARTSHORN, NEW
ENGLAND SHERIFF (Worcester, Warren Lazell 1844); JOHN MILTON NILES, THE CONNECTICUT
CIVIL OFFICER tford, Huntington & Hopkins 1823); JOHN H.B. LATROBE, THE JUSTICES’
PRACTICE UNDER THE LAWS OF MARYLAND: INCLUDING THE DUTIES OF A CONSTABLE 22
(Baltimore, Fielding Lucas, Jr. 1826); HENRY POTTER, THE OFFICE AND DUTY OF A JUSTICE OF
THE PEACE…ACCORDING TO THE LAWS OF NORTH CAROLINA 243–44 (Raleigh, Joseph Gales
1816).
For a general critique of historian Cornell’s claims about legal doctrine, see Brief Amicus
Curiae of Professors of Law, History, Politics, and Government In Support of PlaintiffsAppellees and in Support of Affirmance, 2012 WL 3164535, in Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d
865 (4th Cir. 2013).
346 Wright v. Commonwealth, 77 Pa. St. 470 (1875).
347 Id. at 470.
348 Id. at 471.
349 Id. at 471.

52

H. Missouri

State v. Wilforth (Mo. 1881). 350 Like several state constitutions, Missouri’s
right to arms had an express exception for carrying concealed weapons. 351
Wilforth had gone to a church house which was hosting a school exhibition “for
literary purposes.” 352 At the event, Wilforth carried “about his person firearms.” 353 This violated the state statute carrying any deadly weapon into “any
school room, or place where people are assembled for educational, literary, or
social purposes, or to any election precinct on election day….” Wilforth
appealed his conviction for illegal carry but did not file a brief on appeal.
Below, he had asked for jury instructions that they should acquit “if they
believed defendant carried the pistol for the purpose of trade, or went into the
house where the exhibition was going on having reasonable cause to believe
that he would be in danger of bodily harm.” 354 The Supreme Court ruled that
the proposed jury instructions were properly refused because “there was not a
scintilla of evidence upon which to base them.” 355
Wilforth is another early ancestor of the Supreme Court Heller rule
allowing carry prohibition “in sensitive places, such as schools and government
buildings.” 356
State v. Shelby (Mo. 1886). 357 Shelby was staying at the Palace Hotel in the
city of Gallatin when he “took a pistol from his coat pocket, where it was
concealed, and laid it upon his lap while seated at the table in the dining-room,
and that at the time the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating
State v. Wilforth, 74 Mo. 528 (1881).
Under the 1875 Constitution: “That the right of no citizen to keep and bear arms in
defense of his home, person and property, or in aid of the civil power, when thereto legally
summoned, shall be called in question; but nothing herein contained is intended to justify the
practice of wearing concealed weapons. MO. CONST. art. II, § 17.
The current provision is:
350
351

That the right of every citizen to keep and bear arms, ammunition, and
accessories typical to the normal function of such arms, in defense of his home,
person, family and property, or when lawfully summoned in aid of the civil
power, shall not be questioned. The rights guaranteed by this section shall be
unalienable. Any restriction on these rights shall be subject to strict scrutiny
and the state of Missouri shall be obligated to uphold these rights and shall
under no circumstances decline to protect against their infringement. Nothing
in this section shall be construed to prevent the general assembly from
enacting general laws which limit the rights of convicted violent felons or those
duly adjudged mentally infirm by a court of competent jurisdiction.
MO. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1945 Const., 2014 amend.).
352 Id. at 529.
353 Id.
354 Wilforth at 529–30.
355 Id. at 530.
356 Heller at 626-27.
357 State v. Shelby, 90 Mo. 302, 2 S.W. 468 (1886).
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drink.” 358 He was convicted for carrying his revolver in violation of 1. The
statute against concealed carry, and 2. The statute against carrying a deadly
weapon while intoxicated (with an exception for self-defense).
On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court ruled that “a revolving pistol comes
within the description of such arms as one may carry for the purposes
designated in the constitution.” 359 However, the concealed carry ban was
expressly permitted by the state constitution. The ban on intoxicated carry was
valid under the precedent of the school carry ban which had been upheld in
Wilforth.
The convictions of two separate offenses were nevertheless void. Both
crimes were based on “but one carrying…[t]he fact that defendant took the
pistol out and laid it upon his lap but furnished the proof of his guilt, and in no
just sense can it be said the defendant was guilty of two distinct offenses.” 360
Because the state “could take a verdict of guilty for one offense, but not for
both,” the convictions were reversed and remanded. 361
Bans on using firearms while intoxicated are now common. 362 Wilforth may
be the first case upholding such a ban.

I. North Carolina

State v. Speller (N.C. 1882). 363 The 1876 constitution’s right to arms section
explicitly excluded “the practice of carrying concealed weapons” and expressly
authorized the legislature to enact penal laws against them. 364 The legislature
did so in 1879. 365
One Saturday night, L.R. Speller and Jenkins argued. According to Speller,
Jenkins attempted to cut Speller with a razor and threatened that he would
kill Speller very soon. Jenkins lived a half-mile from Speller. The nearest peace
officer lived a mile and half away; the nearest justice, four miles. On Monday,
Speller and Jenkins each went to court and swore out warrants against each
other. When the officer came to arrest Speller, a search revealed the Speller
was carrying a concealed handgun. 366
At trial, the judge refused to allow Speller to present his side of the story.
The North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that the trial court had acted
properly. Presuming that Speller’s self-defense story was correct, he could have
carried the gun openly. “The right to wear secret weapons is no more essential
Id. at 2 S.W. 469.
Id.
360 Id. at 469–70.
361 Id. at 470.
362 For the modern Missouri law, see, MO. STATS. § 571.030.1(5); Missouri v. Richard, 298
S.W.3d 529 (Mo. 2009) (upholding statute); cf. People v. Garcia, 197 Colo. 550, 595 P.2d 228
(1979) (applying a narrowing construction so that the statute only covers “actual or physical
control”; it is not illegal to be drunk in the same room where one stores a firearm).
363 State v. Speller, 86 N.C. 697 (1882).
364 N.C. CONSt. art. I, § 24 (1876).
365 Speller at 697.
366 Id. at 697.
358
359
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to the protection of one man than another, and surely it cannot be supposed
that the law intends that an unwary advantage should be taken even of an
enemy.” 367

J. West Virginia

State v. Workman (W.V. 1891). 368 A state statute banned the carrying of
handguns, bowie knives, and some other weapons (but not long guns). The
statute had several exceptions, including that if
the defendant shall prove to the satisfaction of the jury that he is
a quiet and peaceable citizen, of good character and standing in
the community in which he lives, and at the time….he had good
cause to believe, and did believe, that he was in danger of death
or great bodily harm at the hands of another person, and that he
was, in good faith, carrying such weapon for self–defense and for
no other purpose, the jury shall find him not guilty. 369
Erastus Workman, of Boone County, was convicted in a bench trial of
violating the carry statute. On appeal, he argued that he was entitled as a
matter of law to an acquittal, based upon the statutory language.
At trial, Erastus Workman had presented the testimony of Elsworth
Workman, who said that he had heard George Ball threaten to murder Erastus
Workman. The witness also said that he had warned Erastus of Ball’s threats.
The witness said that George Ball has a well-deserved reputation as “a
dangerous man.” 370
This testimony was buttressed Ester A. Ball, the sister of George Ball, and
also his ex-wife. She testified that from the winter of 1888 through the spring
of 1889, she had heard George Ball threaten to kill Erastus Workman, and had
warned the defendant about the threats. She too considered that “George Ball
was a very dangerous man.” 371 Erastus Workman testified that he had been
informed about the threats in the Spring of 1889, and had begun carrying a
pistol thereafter, “for no other purpose than to defend himself against the said
George Ball.” 372
The November 1891 Supreme Court decision does not specify on what date
Erastus Workman had carried the handgun. Whenever it was, it was too long
for the Supreme Court to consider the self-defense exception applicable. He
Id. at 700.
State v. Workman, 35 W.Va. 367, 14 S.E. 9 (1891). For a history of the arms right in
West Virginia, see Stephen P. Halbrook, Rationing Firearms Purchases and the Right to Keep
Arms: Reflections on the Bills of Rights of Virginia, West Virginia, and the United States, 96
W.V. L. REV. 1 (1993).
369 Workman, 14 S.E. at 9.
370 Id.
371 Id. at 10.
372 Id.
367
368
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had not gone to the authorities for help, and this negated his claim to be
carrying “in good faith…for self–defense and for no other purpose.” 373
Workman used the civilized warfare test, stating it with unusual
narrowness—the first court to include no handguns on the protected side. The
right was for “swords, guns, rifles, and muskets,—arms to be used in defending
the state and civil liberty” and not for “pistols, bowie–knife, brass knuckles,
billies, and such other weapons as are usually employed in brawls, street
fights, duels, and affrays, and are only habitually carried by bullies,
blackguards, and desperadoes.” 374
The civilized warfare test for which arms are protected by the Second
Amendment, which was invented by Aymette, and later employed by Andrews,
Hill, English, and Workman, is obviously no longer valid; Heller is very clear
that the individual right to keep and bear arms does not require any militia or
military nexus for either the individual or the arm. Nevertheless, two courts,
in defiance of Heller, have upheld arms bans partly on the basis that the arm
in question is not a militia arm. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
did so in Commonwealth v. Caetano for electric stun guns, citing the aforesaid
state cases. 375
Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit ignored Heller and Seventh
Circuit precedent to uphold a ban on “assault weapons” and “large” magazines
(over ten rounds). 376 The case involved a municipal ban, and during oral
argument, the plaintiffs agreed that the ban would be equally unconstitutional
if it had been passed by the state. 377 According to Chief Judge Easterbrook,
“states, which are in charge of militias, should be allowed to decide when
civilians can possess military-grade firearms, so as to have them available
when the militia is called to duty.” 378 Thus, state gun prohibitions are fine,
because states are in charge of what arms the militia will have.
This contradicts the constitutional text. The Constitution grants Congress,
not the States, the power “To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining
the Militia,” while “reserving to the States” the appointment of officers and
training. 379 Accordingly, Congress, and not state legislatures or city councils,
is the source for what constitute militia arms. If the Highland Park militia test
were to be applied by its own terms, then because Congress has not banned
“assault weapons” or magazines, they are necessarily militia arms.
Caetano and Highland Park fit well with several of the post-war cases, in
that they remind us that some judges wish that there were no right to arms,
and they will do what they can to make their wish a reality.
Id.
Id.
375 Commonwealth v. Caetano, 470 Mass. 774, 779, 26 N.E.3d 688, 693 (2015).
376 Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015).
377 Id. at 410–11.
378 Id. at 410.
379 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8 cl. 16 (emphasis added).
373
374
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K. Illinois and Lyman Trumbull
Before becoming a U.S. Senator from Illinois, Lyman Trumbull had been
the state’s leading anti-slavery lawyer. 380 In 1873 he returned to Illinois,
practicing and teaching law in Chicago. While in the Senate, he had also often
appeared as a lawyer before the Supreme Court, and he continued to build a
Supreme Court practice after he returned to Illinois.
According to his friend Clarence Darrow, Trumbull’s lifelong cause was “a
fair chance” for “the poor who toil for a living in this world.” 381 In Chicago, that
would include immigrant laborers, whose right to assemble, protest, and strike
was sometimes violently suppressed.
Workingmen’s organizations such as German immigrant Lehr und Wehr
Verein organized community sporting activities—and also trained with arms,
for the expressed goal of protecting workers from violence. 382 The training,
drilling, and parading of such groups were outlawed by the 1879 Militia Act;
the activities were only allowed if the Governor granted a special permit, and
he had complete discretion to refuse. 383
1. Illinois v. Bielfeld
Because the new law was so controversial, the Governor agreed that there
should be a test case. In Illinois v. Bielfield, the Cook County Circuit Court
declared that the new law violated the Second Amendment. The Circuit Court’s
panel opinion was the longest exposition of the Second Amendment yet written
by an American court. The Chicago Tribune reprinted the entire decision. 384
The Circuit Court analyzed the issue along of the lines of the antebellum
Georgia and Louisiana courts: concealed carry could be banned, but not the
open parade and drill of Lehr und Wehr Verein. The right to practice with arms
included the right to practice in a group.
But unfortunately for the challengers, Bielfield had procedural problems
which made it impossible for Illinois (the losing party in the trial court) to
appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, for a definitive ruling. For the next case,
Lyman Trumbull would be the lead attorney.

See David B. Kopel, Lyman Trumbull: Author of the Thirteenth Amendment, Author of
the Civil Rights Act, and the First Second Amendment Lawyer, 47 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. (issue
4, forthcoming 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2564819.
381 CHI. TIMES, June 26, 1896, HORACE WHITE, THE LIFE OF LYMAN TRUMBULL 425–26
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1913).
382 Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right Of Workers To Assemble And To Bear Arms: Presser v.
Illinois, One of the Last Holdouts against Application of the Bill of Rights to the States, 76 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 943 (1999). This article is the best history of Illinois cases.
383 An act to provide for the organization of the State militia, BRADWELL, LAWS OF ILLINOIS
(1879), 149 (May 28, 1879) [hereinafter Militia Act].
384 Militia Law, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 2, 1879, at 6.
380
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2. Dunne v. Illinois
The formal basis of the second case was that the new law exempted Illinois
National Guard officers from jury duty. Dunne, an Illinois officer, claimed the
exemption when summoned for a jury; he refused to serve, so the trial judge
held him in contempt, and fined Dunne $50. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed
that on appeal it would consider all aspects of the Militia Act. 385
By a 6-1 vote, the Court upheld the Militia Act. 386 Most of the Court’s
opinion was devoted to whether it was preempted by federal militia law. This
raised the complicated question of whether Congress’s enumerated powers
over the militia (in Article I, § 8, clauses 15–16) were exclusive of state power,
or whether concurrent state power could exist. The leading Supreme Court
case on the subject was Houston v. Moore (1814), and it was not a model of
clarity. 387 The Illinois Court decided that federal law still left room for Illinois
to re-organize its militia.
Illinois at the time had no express right to arms guarantee. Like Bielfield,
the Dunne Court took it for granted that the right to arms was a limitation on
all American governments, and that it included personal defense. But the
Court scoffed at the idea that Lehr und Wehr Verein’s mass activities had
anything to do with the right. “The right of the citizen to ‘bear arms’ for the
defence of his person and property is not involved, even remotely, in this
discussion.” 388
3. Presser v. Illinois
In apparent abundance of caution, Trumbull had brought another test
case. 389 This one involved Lehr und Wehr Verein officer Hermann Presser.
Carrying a sword, he had led a Labor Day parade of men carrying unloaded
rifles. 390 After being convicted of having led an armed parade without a permit,
he was fined ten dollars, and appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court. For
procedural reasons, the case lingered there for years. 391 Finally, it was
affirmed by an unpublished and terse per curiam opinion which just cited
Dunne. 392 But Presser was the case that the U.S. Supreme Court decided to
hear.
The Court refused to consider the federal militia law preemption issues,
since they were irrelevant to the charge on which Presser had been convicted,
“even if the other sections of the act were invalid.” 393
Dunne v. Illinois, 94 Ill. 120 (1879).
Dunne at 140–41.
387 Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820)
388 Dunne, 94 Ill. at 140.
389 Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
390 Halbrook at .
391 Id. at.
392 Id. at.
393 Presser, 116 U.S. at 261–63.
385
386
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On the Second Amendment, Trumbull’s brief argued that the Amendment
was collective as well as individual. Requiring the Governor’s consent for
“drilling, officering, organizing” was absurd, for this was “the consent, of the
very man, against whose usurpation of powers, their organization and arming
may, perhaps be directed, and lawfully so.” 394
The Illinois Attorney General answered: “the right to keep and bear arms
by no means includes the right to assemble and publicly parade in the manner
forbidden by the law under which the conviction in this case was had.” 395
The Supreme Court agreed with the Attorney General: the Illinois
provisions “which only forbid bodies of men to associate together as military
organizations, or to drill or parade with arms in cities and towns unless
authorized by law, do not infringe the right of the people to keep and bear
arms.” 396 Besides that, the “conclusive answer” was Second Amendment “is a
limitation only upon the power of Congress and the National government, and
not upon that of the state.” 397 As for the Privileges or Immunities claim, “The
right voluntarily to associate together as a military company or organization,
or to drill or parade with arms, without, and independent of, an act of congress
or law of the state authorizing the same, is not an attribute of national
citizenship.” 398
Whatever Cruikshank had meant, outside the South it apparently had not
been uniformly construed by the public as shielding states from having to obey
the Second Amendment. As a leading member of the Supreme Court bar,
Trumbull would be unlikely spend his time on hopeless cases. Presser got the
message across. An article summarizing Presser in the Central Law Journal
concluded that “It will no doubt be news to most people, not members of the
legal profession, and to many who are,” that the Second Amendment offered
no protection from state anti-gun laws. 399
In an era fraught with urban riots and immigrant labor unrest, the
Supreme Court was disinclined to protect large assemblies which might have
revolutionary ideas. 400 Heller does acknowledge that one purpose of the Second
Petitioner’s Brief at 18, quoted in Halbrook, Right of Workers.
Respondent’s Brief at 8, in Halbrook.
396 Presser at 264–65.
397 Id. at 265. The Court cited Cruikshank, Barron v. Baltimore, Newsom, Andews, and
Fife, as well as some cases not involving the Second Amendment. Id.
398 Id. at 267
399 Constitutional Law--Militia--Right to Bear Arms, 22 CENT. L.J. 411, 412–13 (1886). The
Central Law Journal was a weekly legal newspaper, first published in 1874, and continuing
until 1827. It concentrated on the U.S. Supreme Court and the Mississippi Valley. 1 CENT. L.J.
1 (Jan. 1, 1874). The publishers were John F. Dillon and Seymour D. Thompson. Dillon was a
former Justice of the Iowa Supreme Court and (as of 1874), a Judge of the Eighth Circuit. Both
were authors of influential treatises.
400 Although the parade at issue, and Lehr und Wehr Werein in general had been peaceful,
the Court warned that a ruling in favor of Presser would “deny the right of the state to disperse
assemblages organized for sedition and treason, and the right to suppress armed mobs bent
on riot and rapine.” Presser at 267.
394
395
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Amendment is that “when the able-bodied men of a nation are trained in arms
and organized, they are better able to resist tyranny.” 401 Yet Heller is more
about personal defense than anything else. “[T]he right of law-abiding,
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home” is the core of
the core of the Heller right. 402

Conclusion

As right to arms jurisprudence develops in the post-Heller era, the
nineteenth century cases have attracted newfound interest. A look at the
Westlaw “Citing References” finds that most of them have been cited several
times, sometimes often, in judicial opinions and in appellate briefs. With a few
exceptions such as Nunn, Aymette, and Andrews, most of them were obscure in
the century before Heller. In the first century of Second Amendment cases, we
can see some of the emerging contours of the Second Amendment as it is
understood today: a right to own and carry handguns and other firearms for
self-defense and other legitimate purposes—but not an unlimited right. There
may be regulation of the manner of carry (open vs. concealed); carrying may be
prohibited in sensitive places, such as courthouses and schools. Restrictions on
giving handguns to unsupervised minors are not novel. Intoxicated use may be
forbidden.
The jurisprudence of the nineteenth century, especially in the latter cases
from Tennessee and Arkansas, also offers a negative example, which resulted
in the evisceration of Second Amendment rights. By 1891, citizens of those
states were greatly restricted in the choice of handguns they could purchase,
and were disabled from carrying those handguns, in any reasonable manner,
for self-defense outside their premises (except when on a journey). The first of
the judicial sequence of errors was defining the right to arms narrowly, as only
encompassing a few of the right’s purposes (militia, or resistance to tyranny).
The next error was reliance on incorrect judicial intuition rather than factfinding to assert that certain arms (such as bowie knives) were not useful for
the narrow purposes.
Some courts, such as Georgia’s, were able to uphold bans on concealed carry
without that ban leading to a slippery slope of arms prohibition. Yet in other
states, the ban on concealed carry led to ban on the sale of concealable
handguns—thus depriving citizens of the handguns which might be the best
choice (ergonomically or economically) for those citizens when defending
hearth and home. The sensible notion that the manner of carrying may be
regulated (open vs. concealed) was perverted by a purported “manner”
regulation (“in the hand”) which amounted to “destruction of the right.”
Eventually, prohibition becomes a categorical imperative, detached from
common sense, common law, and constitutional right—so a gunsmith was
401
402

Heller at 598.
Id. at 635.
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criminally convicted for having delivered a repaired handgun to a sheriff. In
retrospect, the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision not to start going down the
slippery slope (Bliss, 1822, rejecting a ban on sword canes) helped prevent
Kentucky from falling to the anti-constitutional depths of some other southern
states.
Another lesson we can draw from the nineteenth century is that restrictive
rules from the era may be abandoned if they no longer make sense. While the
overwhelming majority of states in the nineteenth century did not prohibit any
type of firearm, the states which did impose bans used the “civilized warfare”
test. Although the test may not be clear at the margins, it was reasonably clear
at the core, protecting the types of long guns and handguns typically carried
by ordinary soldiers and their officers. But by the time Heller was decided, that
test would have protected rifles that the public overwhelmingly did not want
(such as the M-16 rifle) and would have greatly constricted the variety of
handguns that the public did want. (“Civilized warfare” would protect the
current military handgun, the Beretta 92, predecessors such as the Colt 1911,
and similar guns from other manufacturers.) So the Heller Court wisely chose
a broader reading of the Second Amendment right, not founded exclusively on
whether a firearm is used by the military.
A similar reconsideration is due for concealed carry. While “civilized
warfare” was the model only in a minority of especially restrictive states,
concealed carry bans were widespread, and by 1891, they could be found in
many states. Yet while the nineteenth century extolled open carry and feared
concealed carry, social norms in the twenty-first century are different. All but
a handful of states have fair, objective laws for issuing concealed carry licenses.
Overwhelmingly, the manner in which Americans exercise their right to bear
arms for lawful defense in public places today is by concealed carry, not open
carry. While Heller’s description of the nineteenth century concealed carry
cases was accurate, modern jurisprudence can recognize that on this subject,
modern Americans have developed a more expansive vision of the right than
the vision that their ancestors held in 1891. Indeed, the modern view of the
legitimacy of concealed carry is closer to the original vision of 1791 than is the
anti-concealment theory of the nineteenth century.
The nineteenth century cases on concealed carry can still play a modern
role, by demonstrating the legitimacy of regulations for concealed carry
licenses that many persons would consider inappropriate for mere possession
of a firearm on one’s own property. These include biometric fingerprint-based
background checks, an application process that can take weeks or months,
mandatory safety training, and bounded discretion for a Sheriff or similar
official to veto or revoke a concealed carry permit, based on particular facts
about the individual.
Some people today think that the political battles over gun control have
always been drawn on the same sectional lines. Yet during the latter
nineteenth century, it was the Southern legislatures which were the most
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ardent for gun control, while New York, Connecticut, and most of the rest of
the country were not. Now, the roles are reversed, with New York City as the
epicenter of gun prohibition advocacy, while Tennessee, Arkansas, and most
Southern states have “F” ratings from the Brady Campaign. 403 The historical
variability of local enthusiasm for infringement on Second Amendment rights
is one reason to reject special pleading to exempt various localities from
compliance with the ordinary Second Amendment. 404
The South eventually redeemed itself from Jim Crow gun control. 405 Today,
citizens of those states can, like Americans in most other states, choose from
among the full range of handguns, not just the Army/Navy models. They can
carry handguns, after going through a fair licensing system which respects the
right of defensive carry.
As in the nineteenth century, judicial willingness to enforce the right to
arms varies. The Jim Crow period offers precedents for modern judges who
favor infringement or even elimination of Second Amendment rights. The
better precedents from the nineteenth century are those favored by Heller and
McDonald. They are consistent with the American tradition of ordered liberty,
and of recognition that the Second Amendment is just as fundamental and
deserving of judicial protection as the rest of the Bill of Rights. 406

Brady
Campaign,
2013
State
Scorecard,
http://www.bradycampaign.org/sites/default/files/SCGLM-Final10-spreads-points.pdf.
Twenty-seven states received a Brady “F.” Id.
404 See Ruben & Cornell, supra (asserting that urban areas should be allowed to prohibit
exercise of the right to bear arms).
405 When ex-Confederate states threw off Reconstruction, and imposed white supremacy
via Jim Crow laws, the phrase at the time was that the state had been “redeemed.” Robert J.
Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, “Never Intended to be Applied to the White Population”:
Firearms Regulation and Racial Disparity--The Redeemed South’s Legacy to a National
Jurisprudence?, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1307 (1995). Today, the better understanding is the Jim
Crow laws were un-American, and that true redemption involved the South’s rejection of the
racist past.
406 The Second Amendment is not “a second-class right, subject to an entirely different body
of rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees...” McDonald at 780.
403

62

